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Abstract
We introduce several versions of game-theoretic semantics (GTS) for Alternating-
Time Temporal Logic (ATL). In GTS, truth is defined in terms of existence of a
winning strategy in a semantic evaluation game, and thus the game-theoretic per-
spective appears in the framework of ATL on two semantic levels: on the object level
in the standard semantics of the strategic operators, and on the meta-level where
game-theoretic logical semantics is applied to ATL. We unify these two perspectives
into semantic evaluation games specially designed for ATL. The game-theoretic per-
spective enables us to identify new variants of the semantics of ATL based on limiting
the time resources available to the verifier and falsifier in the semantic evaluation
game. We introduce and analyse an unbounded and (ordinal) bounded GTS and
prove these to be equivalent to the standard (Tarski-style) compositional semantics.
We show that in bounded GTS, truth of ATL formulae can always be determined
in finite time, i.e., without constructing infinite paths. We also introduce a non-
equivalent finitely bounded semantics and argue that it is natural from both logical
and game-theoretic perspectives.
1 Introduction
Alternating-Time Temporal Logic ATL was introduced in [4] as a multi-agent extension
of the branching-time temporal logic CTL. The semantics of ATL is defined over multi-
agent transition systems, also known as concurrent game models, in which agents take
simultaneous actions at the current state and the resulting collective action determines
the subsequent transition to a successor state. The logic ATL and its extension ATL∗
have gradually become the most popular logical formalisms for reasoning about strategic
abilities of agents in synchronous multi-agent systems.
Game-theoretic semantics (GTS) of logical languages has a rich history going back
to Hintikka [20], Lorenzen [24] and others. For an overview of the topic, see [22]. In
GTS, truth of a logical formula ϕ is determined in a formal debate between two players,
Eloise and Abelard. Eloise is trying to verify ϕ, while Abelard is opposing her and trying
to falsify it. Each logical connective in the language is associated with a related rule
in the game. The framework of GTS has turned out to be particularly useful for the
purpose of defining variants of semantic approaches to different logics. For example,
the IF-logic of Hintikka and Sandu [21] is an extension of first-order logic which was
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originally developed using GTS. Also, the game-theoretic approach to semantics has led
to new methods for solving decision problems of logics, e.g., via using parity games for
the µ-calculus. The close connection between between µ-calculus model checking and
parity games was first discussed in [11].
Here we introduce game-theoretic semantics for ATL. In our framework, the rules
corresponding to strategic operators involve scenarios where Eloise and Abelard are
both controlling (leading) coalitions of agents with opposing objectives. The perspective
offered by GTS enables us to develop novel approaches to ATL based on different time
resources available to the players. In unbounded GTS, a coalition trying to verify an until-
formula is allowed to continue without a time limit, the price of an infinite play being a
loss in the game. In bounded GTS, the coalition must commit to finishing in finite time
by submitting an ordinal number in the beginning of the game. That ordinal controls
the available time resources in the game and guarantees a finite play. Notably, even
safety games (for always-formulae) are evaluated in finite time, and thus the bounded
and unbounded approaches to GTS are conceptually very different. However, despite
the differences between the two semantics, we show that they are in fact equivalent to
the standard compositional (i.e., Tarski-style) semantics of ATL, and therefore also to
each other.
We also introduce a restricted variant of the bounded GTS, called finitely bounded
GTS, where the ordinals controlling the time flow must always be finite. This is a partic-
ularly simple system of semantics where the players will always announce the ultimate
(always finite) duration of the game before the game begins. We show that the finitely
bounded GTS is equivalent to the standard ATL semantics on image-finite models, and
therefore provides an alternative approach to ATL sufficient for most practical purposes.
It is worth noting here that the difference between the finitely bounded and unbounded
semantics is conceptually directly linked to the difference between for-loops and while-
loops. Since the finitely bounded semantics is new, we also develop an equivalent (over
all models) Tarski-style semantics for it.
For all systems of game-theoretic semantics studied here, we show that positional
strategies suffice in the perfect information setting for ATL. In the framework of un-
bounded semantics, this means that strategies depend on the current state only. In the
case of bounded and finitely bounded semantics, strategies may additionally depend on
the value of the ordinal guiding the time flow of the game. As a by-product of our
semantic investigations, we also introduce and study a range of new game-theoretic no-
tions that are of interest also outside ATL, such as, e.g., timed strategies, n-canonical
strategies, ∞-canonical strategies.
There are several related works concerning both ATL and its extensions as well as
game-theoretic semantics. We mention here some such papers.1
• Imposing explicit time bounds on temporal operators in logical specification lan-
guages has often been done syntactically in the context of quantitative temporal
reasoning, see, e.g., [12]. Typically, that amounts, e.g., to replacing F q by a dis-
junction q∨F q∨ ...∨F kq, abbreviated by F≤kq, for k ∈ N, that imposes an explicit
and uniform bound of k steps for satisfying the eventuality q.
• Imposing time bounds in the semantics of temporal operators has also been pro-
posed in several contexts, most notably in relation to finitary fairness [5] and
promptness in LTL [23] as well as in omega-regular and parity games [8], [3], [26],
[6]. The idea of promptness (in LTL) is to replace the unbounded eventuality
operator F by a “bounded-eventually” operator F p for which an upper bound for
1We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out many of these references.
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the satisfaction of the eventuality is explicitly specified in the semantics.
• GTS-like approaches have been used to solve decision problems of, e.g., fragments
of Strategy Logic (especially with respect to the so-called “behavioral semantics”)
in [25], [7].
• The article [19] discusses an alternative game-theoretic semantics for the modal
µ-calculus based on imposing time-bounds on the fixed-point operators.
• In the recent work [16], we introduce and study the variant of CTL with finitely
bounded semantics. We show that it is a proper sublogic (in terms of validities)
of standard CTL. We also show that it lacks the finite model property, but its
satisfiability problem is nevertheless decidable (shown via finitary tableaux meth-
ods) and still EXPTIME-complete. In [18], we extend these results for ATL and
also provide an infinitary complete axiomatization for ATL with finitely bounded
semantics.
The main contributions of this paper are twofold: the development of game-theoretic
semantics for ATL and the introduction of new resource-sensitive versions of logics for
multi-agent strategic reasoning. The latter relates conceptually to the study of other
resource-bounded versions of ATL, see, e.g., [2], [27], [1]. We note that some of our
technical results could be obtained using alternative methods from coalgebraic modal
logic. We discuss this issue in more detail in the concluding section 5.3.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After the preliminaries in Section 2, we
develop the bounded and unbounded GTS in Section 3. We analyse these frameworks in
Section 4, where we show, inter alia, that the two game-theoretic systems, bounded and
unbounded, are equivalent. In Section 5, we compare the game-theoretic and standard
Tarski-style semantics and establish the above-mentioned equivalences between them.
After brief concluding remarks, we provide an appendix section 5.3 with some technical
proofs.
2 Preliminaries
Here we define concurrent game models as well as the syntax and standard compositional
semantics of ATL. For detailed background on these, see [4] or [14].
Definition 2.1. A concurrent game model (CGM) M is a tuple
(Agt,St,Π,Act, d, o, v)
which consists of the following non-empty sets:
– agents Agt = {1, . . . , k},
– states St,
– proposition symbols Π,
– actions Act,
and the following functions:
– an action function d : Agt×St→ (P(Act) \ {∅}), which assigns to each agent at
each state a non-empty set of actions available to the agent at that state;
– a transition function o, which assigns to each state q ∈ St and action profile
~α at q (where ~α is a tuple of actions ~α = (α1, . . . , αk) such that αi ∈ d(i, q) for each
i ∈ Agt), a unique outcome state o(q, ~α);
– and a valuation function v : Π→ P(St).
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Sets of agents A ⊆ Agt are also called coalitions. The complement A = Agt \A of
a coalition A is called the opposing coalition (of A). We also define the set of action
tuples that are available to a coalition A at a state q ∈ St:
action(A, q) := {(αi)i∈A | αi ∈ d(i, q) for each i ∈ A}.
Definition 2.2. Let M = (Agt,St,Π,Act, d, o, v) be a concurrent game model. A
(positional) strategy2 for an agent a ∈ Agt is a function sa : St → Act such that
sa(q) ∈ d(a, q) for each q ∈ St. A collective strategy SA for A ⊆ Agt is a tuple of
individual strategies, one for each agent in A. A path in M is a sequence of states Λ
such that Λ[n+1] = o(Λ[n], ~α) for some action profile ~α for Λ[n], where Λ[n] is the n-th
state in Λ (n ∈ N). The function paths(q, SA) returns the set of all paths generated
when the agents in A play according to SA, beginning from the state q.
Alternating-time temporal logic ATL, introduced in [4], is a logic, suitable for
specifying and verifying qualitative objectives of players and coalitions in concurrent
game models. The main syntactic construct of ATL is a formula of type 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, intuitively
meaning that the coalition A has a collective strategy to guarantee the satisfaction of the
objective ϕ on every play enabled by that strategy. The syntax of ATL is defined as
follows3
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∨ ϕ) | 〈〈A〉〉Xϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕUϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕRϕ
where A ⊆ Agt and p ∈ Π. Other Boolean connectives are defined as usual, and the
combined operators 〈〈A〉〉Fϕ and 〈〈A〉〉Gϕ are defined respectively by 〈〈A〉〉>Uϕ and
〈〈A〉〉⊥Rϕ.
Definition 2.3. Let M = (Agt,St,Π,Act, d, o, v) be a CGM, q ∈ St a state and ϕ an
ATL-formula. Truth of ϕ in M at q, denoted by M, q |= ϕ, is defined as follows:
• M, q |= p iff q ∈ v(p) (for p ∈ Π ).
• M, q |= ¬ψ iff M, q 6|= ψ.
• M, q |= ψ ∨ θ iff M, q |= ψ or M, q |= θ.
• M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉Xψ iff there exists a collective strategy SA such that for each Λ ∈
paths(q, SA), we have M,Λ[1] |= ψ.
• M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ iff there exists a collective strategy SA such that for each Λ ∈
paths(q, SA), there is i ≥ 0 such that M,Λ[i] |= θ and M,Λ[j] |= ψ for every j < i.
• M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ iff there exists a collective strategy SA such that for each Λ ∈
paths(q, SA) and i ≥ 0, we have M,Λ[i] |= θ or there is j < i such that M,Λ[j] |= ψ.
3 Game-theoretic semantics
In this section we introduce three versions of evaluation games for ATL: unbounded,
(ordinal) bounded, and finitely bounded evaluation games. These games will ultimately
enable us to define three different versions of game-theoretic semantics for ATL.
2Unless otherwise specified, a ‘strategy’ hereafter will mean a positional and deterministic strategy.
3The operator R (Release) was not part of the original syntax of ATL but has been commonly added
later.
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3.1 Unbounded evaluation games
Given a CGM M, a state qin and a formula ϕ, the evaluation game G(M, qin, ϕ)
is, intuitively, a debate between two opponents, Eloise (E) and Abelard (A), about
whether the formula ϕ is true at the state qin in the model M. Eloise claims that ϕ
is true, so she adopts (initially) the role of a verifier in the game, and Abelard tries
to prove the formula false, so he is (initially) the falsifier. These roles can swap in
the course of the game when negations are encountered in the formula to be evaluated.
Truth of an ATL formula ϕ inM at qin will be defined as existence of a winning strategy
for E in the game G(M, qin, ϕ).
We will often use the following notation: if P ∈ {A,E}, then P denotes the oppo-
nent of P, i.e., P ∈ {A,E} \ {P}.
Definition 3.1. Let M = (Agt, St,Π,Act, d, o, v) be a CGM, qin ∈ St and ϕ an ATL-
formula. The unbounded evaluation game G(M, qin, ϕ) between the players A and
E is defined as follows.
• A position of the game is a tuple Pos=(P, q, ψ) where P ∈ {A,E}, q ∈ St and ψ is
a subformula of ϕ. The initial position of the game is Pos0 := (E, qin, ϕ).
• In every position (P, q, ψ), the player P is called the verifier and P the falsifier for
that position.
• Each position of the game is associated with a rule. The rules for positions where the
related formula is either a proposition symbol or has a Boolean connective as its main
connective, are defined as follows.
1. If Posi = (P, q, p), where p ∈ Π, then Posi is called an ending position of the
evaluation game. If q ∈ v(p), then P wins the evaluation game. Else P wins.
2. Let Posi = (P, q,¬ψ). The game then moves to the next position Posi+1 = (P, q, ψ).
3. Let Posi = (P, q, ψ ∨ θ). Then the player P decides whether the next position Posi+1
is (P, q, ψ) or Posi+1 = (P, q, θ).
In order to deal with the strategic operators, we now define a one step game,
denoted by step(P, A, q), where A ⊆ Agt. This game consists of the following two
actions.
i) First P chooses an action αi ∈ d(i, q) for each i ∈ A.
ii) Then P chooses an action αi ∈ d(i, q) for each i ∈ A.
The resulting state of the one step game step(P, A, q) is the state
q′ := o(q, α1, . . . , αk)
arising from the combined action of the agents. We now use the one step game to define
how the evaluation game proceeds from positions where the formula is of type 〈〈A〉〉Xψ:
(4) Let Posi = (P, q, 〈〈A〉〉Xψ). The next position Posi+1 is (P, q′, ψ), where q′ is the
resulting state of step(P, A, q).
The rules for the other strategic operators are obtained by iterating the one step
game. For this purpose, we now define the embedded game
G := g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC),
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where both V,C ∈ {E,A}, A is a coalition, q0 a state, and ψC and ψC are formulae.
The player V is called the verifier (of the embedded game) and C the controller.
These players may, but need not be, the same. We let V and C denote the opponents
of V and C, respectively.
The embedded game G starts from the initial state q0 and proceeds from any
state q according to the following rules, applied in the order given below, until an exit
position is reached.
i) C may end the game at the exit position (V, q, ψC).
ii) C may end the game at the exit position (V, q, ψC).
iii) If the game has not ended by the above rules, the one step game step(V, A, q) is
played to produce a resulting state q′. The embedded game is continued from the
state q′.
If the embedded game G continues an infinite number of rounds, the controller C
loses the entire evaluation game G(M, qin, ϕ). Else, the evaluation game resumes from
the exit position of the embedded game.
We now define the rules of the evaluation game for the remaining strategic operators
as follows:
(5) Let Posi = (P, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ). The next position Posi+1 is the exit position of the
embedded game g(P,P, A, q, θ, ψ). (Note the order of the formulae θ and ψ.)
(6) Let Posi = (P, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ). The next position Posi+1 is the exit position of the
embedded game g(P,P, A, q, θ, ψ).
This completes the definition of the evaluation game.
Remark 3.2. The evaluation games we have defined make use of special subgames—
the embedded games. The reason for distinguishing these subgames from the evaluation
games is purely technical and could be avoided. The distinction will help us organize
and simplify proofs later on in the paper. The most natural way of thinking of the
evaluation games and the embedded subgames is that they simply form a single game
used for evaluating formulae of ATL, and the separation of the embedded games matters
only in our reasoning about the evaluation games, not in using these games for evaluating
formulae.
We can say that the embedded game for a formula 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ is an eventuality
game and the embedded game for 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ a safety game. Intuitively, the embedded
game g(V,C, A, q, ψC, ψC) can be seen as a ‘simultaneous reachability game’ where both
players have a goal they are trying to reach before the opponent reaches her/his goal.
The verifier V leads the coalition A and the falsifier V leads the opposing coalition A.
The goal of each of V and V is defined by a formula. When V = C, the goal of V is to
verify ψC and the goal of V is to falsify ψC, where verifying ψC corresponds to reaching
a state where ψC holds and falsifying ψC corresponds to reaching the complement of
the set of states where ψC holds. When V = C, the goal of V is to verify ψC and that
of V is to falsify ψC. Both players V and V have the possibility to end the game when
they believe that they have reached their goal. However, the controller is responsible
for ending the embedded game in finite time, and (s)he will lose if the game continues
infinitely long. If both players reach their targets at the same time, the controller C has
the priority to end the embedded game first.
Ending the embedded game can be seen as “making a claim” which would verify or
falsify the temporal formula being evaluated in the embedded game. For example, in an
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embedded game for 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ, the verifier V may claim at any state q that θ is true at
q and thus ψU θ has been verified. The opponent V can challenge this claim, and thus
the claim is evaluated by continuing the evaluation game from the exit position (V, q, θ).
Similarly, V may claim that ψ is not true at q and thus ψU θ has been falsified. Then
V must defend the truth of ψ from the exit position (V, q, ψ).
It is worth noting that, even though the coalitions in ATL operate concurrently, the
verifier V in the embedded is forced to make the choices for her/his coalition in every
round before the falsifier V, and thus V has the advantage of making her/his choices
after V has made hers/his. Therefore the evaluation games are fully turn-based (which
can be beneficial in some technical contexts). Let us consider how this is reflected in the
standard compositional semantics of ATL (Def 2.3). If the formula 〈〈A〉〉Φ is true, then
by compositional semantics A has a collective strategy SA to enforce Φ regardless of the
actions chosen by A. Hence the strategy SA will work even if the the opposing coalition
A could choose their actions after seeing the actions chosen by A. If 〈〈A〉〉Φ is not true,
then by compositional semantics such a strategy SA simply does not exist. However, in
the embedded game, it is the “responsibility” of the falsifier V to create a path, where
Φ does not hold, by leading the opposing coalition A and being able to choose actions
for it after seeing those chosen for A.
If we compare the intuitive properties of our evaluation game with those of the
standard compositional semantics, we notice that the strategic abilities of coalitions A ⊆
Agt are analysed from a different perspective. The standard compositional semantics
treats strategies explicitly by quantifying over collective strategies SA. In contrast,
the verifier and falsifier simply play the evaluation game step by step by controlling the
coalitions A and A, respectively, and the verifier does not have to announce any strategy
for A. Still, in GTS the strategies need to be treated explicitly, too, when we consider
which of the players has a winning strategy in the evaluation game.
Lastly, in the compositional semantics, temporal formulae are always evaluated on
infinite paths, while in the evaluation game a path is constructed only up to the extent
needed for verifying (or falsifying) a formula. In the unbounded evaluation game, infinite
paths may still be constructed, but only if the controller continues the embedded game
for infinitely many rounds (and thus loses the game).
In the next subsection we define a bounded version of the evaluation game in which
always only finite paths need to be constructed.
3.2 Bounded evaluation games
The difference between bounded and unbounded evaluation games is that in the bounded
case, embedded games are associated with a time limit. In the beginning of a bounded
evaluation game, the controller must announce some, possibly infinite, ordinal γ which
will decrease in each round. This will guarantee that the embedded game (and, in fact,
the entire evaluation game) will end after a finite number of rounds.
Bounded evaluation games G(M, qin, ϕ,Γ) have an additional parameter Γ, which is
an ordinal that fixes a strict upper bound for the ordinals that the players can announce
during the related embedded games. As we will see further, different values of Γ give
rise to different evaluation games and thus lead to different game-theoretic semantics.
Definition 3.3. Let M be a CGM, qin∈St, ϕ an ATL-formula and Γ an ordinal. The
bounded evaluation game (or Γ-bounded evaluation game) G(M, qin, ϕ,Γ) is defined
in the same way as the unbounded evaluation game G(M, qin, ϕ), the only difference be-
tween the two games being the treatment of until- and release-formulae. In the bounded
case, these formulae are treated as follows.
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Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game that arises from a posi-
tion Pos in G(M, qin, ϕ). In the same position Pos in the bounded evaluation game
G(M, qin, ϕ,Γ), the player C first chooses some ordinal γ0 < Γ to be the initial time
limit for the embedded game G. This choice gives rise to a bounded embedded
game that is denoted by G[γ0] and played in the way described below.
A configuration of G[γ0] is a pair (γ, q), where γ is a (possibly infinite) ordinal
called the current time limit and q ∈ St a state called the current state. The
bounded embedded game G[γ0] starts from the initial configuration (γ0, q0) and pro-
ceeds from any configuration (γ, q) according to the following rules, applied in the given
order.
i) If γ = 0, the game ends at the exit position (V, q, ψC).
ii) C may end the game at the exit position (V, q, ψC).
iii) C may end the game at the exit position (V, q, ψC).
iv) If the game has not ended due to the previous rules, then step(V, A, q) is played in
order to produce a resulting state q′. Then the bounded embedded game continues
from the configuration (γ′, q′), where γ′ = γ−1 if γ is a successor ordinal, and if γ
is a limit ordinal, then γ′ is an ordinal smaller than γ and chosen by C.
We denote the set of configurations in G[γ0] by ConfG[γ0]. After the bounded em-
bedded game G[γ0] has reached an exit position—which it will, since ordinals are well-
founded—the evaluation game resumes from the exit position of the embedded game.
It is clear that bounded evaluation games end after a finite number of rounds because
bounded embedded games do. Note, that if time limits are infinite ordinals, they do not
directly determine the number of rounds left in the game, but instead they are related
to the game duration in a more abstract way.
It is also worth noting here that different ways of using ordinals in game-theoretic
considerations go way back. An example of an important and relatively early reference
is [28] which contains references to even earlier related articles.
It is instructive to analyse embedded games independently of evaluation games. An
embedded game of the form G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) can be played without a time
limit as in unbounded evaluation games, or it can be given some time limit γ0 as a
parameter, which leads to the related bounded embedded game G[γ0]. When we use
the plain notation G (as opposed to G[γ0]), we always assume that the embedded game
G is not bounded. We sometimes emphasize this by calling G an unbounded embedded
game. We will study the properties of embedded games in Section 4.
Let ω denote the smallest infinite ordinal. Evaluation games of the form
G(M, qin, ϕ, ω)
constitute a particularly interesting subclass of bounded evaluation games. We call the
games in this class finitely bounded evaluation games. In these games, only finite
time limits can be announced for bounded embedded games.
Note that in Definition 3.3 we could handle successor ordinals in the same way as
limit ordinals. That is, the controller should choose any ordinal γ′ smaller than the
current time limit γ also when γ is a successor ordinal. However, it easy to see that in
this case the best choice for the controller is to always choose γ′ = γ − 1 and thus this
step in the game would be unnecessary. Furthermore, with finitely bounded evaluation
games, it is natural that the time limit is always lowered by one after every transition
in the embedded game.
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Remark 3.4. In this paper the temporal operators 〈〈A〉〉F and 〈〈A〉〉G are regarded as
syntactic abbreviations, and therefore the rules associated with them can be extracted
from those above. We now define alternative rules that could be directly given to 〈〈A〉〉F
and 〈〈A〉〉G in the finitely bounded evaluation games, resulting in an equivalent semantics.
(The fact that this equivalence holds will ultimately be straightforward to observe.)
• Let Posi = (P, q, 〈〈A〉〉Fψ). First the player P chooses some n ∈ N and then the
players iterate step(P, A, q) for at most n times. The player P may decide to stop at
the current state q′ after any number m ≤ n of iterations, and then the evaluation
game is continued from Posi+1 = (P, q
′, ψ).
• Let Posi = (P, q, 〈〈A〉〉Gψ). First the player P chooses some n ∈ N and then the
players iterate step(P, A, q) for at most n times. The player P may decide to stop at
the current state q′ after any number m ≤ n of iterations, and the evaluation game is
then continued from Posi+1 = (P, q
′, ψ).
Similar (but not identical) rules could also be given to 〈〈A〉〉F and 〈〈A〉〉G in the
frameworks based on unbounded and on ordinal-bounded games.
3.3 Game-theoretic semantics
A strategy for a player P ∈ {A,E} will be defined below to be a function on game
positions; in positions where the player P is not required to make a move, the strategy
of P will output a special value “any”, the meaning of which is ‘any possible value’. We
will also use any for some other functions when the output is not relevant, e.g., when
defining a winning strategy, we may assign any for losing positions.
Definition 3.5. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game and P ∈ {A,E}.
A strategy for the player P in G is a function σP whose domain is St and whose
range is specified below.
Firstly, for any q ∈ St, it is possible to define σP(q) ∈ {ψC, ψC}; then σP instructs P
to end the game at the state q. Here it is required that if P = C, then σP(q) = ψC and
if P = C, then σP(q) = ψC. (Intuitively, if σP(q) = ψ ∈ {ψC, ψC}, then the strategy
σP instructs P to claim that ψ is true at q.)
If σP(q) 6∈ {ψC, ψC}, then the following conditions hold.
• If P = V, then σP(q) is a tuple of actions in action(A, q) (to be chosen for A).
• If P = V, then σP(q) is defined to be a response function f : action(A, q) →
action(A, q) that assigns a tuple of actions for A as a response to any tuple of actions
chosen for A (by the opposing player).
Let γ0 be an ordinal. A strategy σP for P in G[γ0] is defined in the same way as a
strategy in G, but the domain of this strategy is the set of all possible configurations
ConfG[γ0].
Note that strategies in embedded games are positional, i.e., they depend only on the
current state in the unbounded case and on the current configuration in the bounded
case. We will see later that if strategies were allowed to depend on more information,
such as the sequence of states played, the resulting semantic systems would be equivalent
to the current ones.
Any strategy σP for an unbounded embedded game G can also be used in any
bounded embedded game G[γ0]: we simply use the same action σP(q) for each config-
uration (γ, q) ∈ ConfG[γ0]. In general, this does not work the other way around, since
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a strategy σP that is defined for configurations may give different values for (γ, q) and
(γ′, q). However, if a strategy σP for a bounded embedded game G[γ0] is independent
of time limits (and thus depends on states only), it can also be used in the unbounded
embedded game G. This observation will be crucial later when we compare bounded
embedded games with the corresponding unbounded embedded games.
We next define the notion of strategy for evaluation games, using strategies for em-
bedded games as sub-strategies. We first present the definition for unbounded evaluation
games.
Definition 3.6. Let P ∈ {A,E}. A strategy for player P in an unbounded
evaluation game G = G(M, qin, ϕ) is a function ΣP defined on the set of positions
POS of G (with the range specified below) satisfying the following conditions.
1. If Pos = (P, q, ψ ∨ θ), then ΣP(Pos) ∈ {ψ, θ}.
2. If Pos = (P, q, 〈〈A〉〉Xψ), then ΣP(Pos) is a tuple of actions in action(A, q) for the one
step game step(P, A, q).
3. If Pos = (P, q, 〈〈A〉〉Xψ), then ΣP(Pos) is a response function f : action(A, q) →
action(A, q) for the one step game step(P, A, q).
4. Let Pos = (P, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψTθ) or Pos = (P, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψTθ), where T ∈ {U,R }. Then
ΣP(Pos) is a strategy σP for P in the respective embedded game g(V,C, A, q, θ, ψ).
5. In all other cases, ΣP(Pos) = any (the player P is not required to make a move).
We say that the player P plays according to the strategy ΣP in the evaluation game
G if P makes her/his choices in G according to that strategy. We then say that ΣP is
a winning strategy for P in G if P wins all plays of G where (s)he plays according to
that strategy.
We now define strategies for bounded evaluation games. This definition differs from
the previous one in positions that lead to an embedded game. Here one of the players
must announce a time limit for the embedded game. The player announcing the time
limit must also decide how to lower the time limit when a limit ordinal is reached: this
will be done by a substrategy, called a timer. Strategies of the other player player may
depend on the announced time limits.
Definition 3.7 (c.f. Remark 3.9). A strategy for player P in a bounded evalu-
ation game G = G(M, qin, ϕ,Γ) is defined as in Definition 3.6, with the exception of
positions with until- and release-formulae, which are treated as follows.
(4) Let Pos = (P, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψTθ) or Pos = (P, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψTθ), where T ∈ {U ,R }, and let
G = g(V,C, A, q, θ, ψ) denote the embedded game related to Pos.
If P = C, then ΣP(Pos) = (γ0, t, σP) such that the following conditions hold.
• γ0 < Γ is an ordinal. It is the choice for the initial time limit and leads to the
bounded embedded game G[γ0].
• t is a function, called timer, on pairs (γ, q), where γ ≤ γ0 is a limit ordinal and
q ∈ St. The value t(γ, q) must be an ordinal less than γ. The timer t gives an
instruction how to lower the time limit γ after a transition to q has been made.
• σP is a strategy for P in G[γ0].
Finally, if P 6= C, then ΣP(Pos) is a function that maps any ordinal γ0 < Γ to some
strategy σP,γ0 for P in G[γ0].
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In finitely bounded evaluation games, only finite time limits γ0 < ω may be an-
nounced by the controller C. Since no limit ordinal can be reached, the timer t can be
omitted from the strategy in this special case.
Remark 3.8. As discussed in Remark 3.2, instead of considering embedded games
as separate subgames of the evaluation game, they can be merged into the evaluation
game. Thus when considering the full evaluation game (including the embedded games),
it is not necessary to make a distinction between positions and configurations. In this
approach we could only consider the strategy ΣP for the evaluation game instead of
having substrategies σP for related embedded games. Moreover, in the bounded case,
the timer t is given as a separate component together with σP, but it could perhaps be
more natural to make it a part of σP.
However, this separation of evaluation games and embedded games, as well as the
corresponding strategies, allows us to analyse the properties of embedded games in a
modular fashion. The separation will also be very useful when comparing GTS with the
standard compositional semantics since the verifier’s strategies σV (without the timer)
will then be very closely related to the collective strategies SA (recall Definition 2.3).
Remark 3.9. Note that in Definition 3.7 we allow, for technical convenience, the strate-
gies for an embedded game g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC)[γ0] to depend on all parameters of the
game; in addition to the configurations (q, γ) that can occur in the embedded game. Nat-
urally the parameters V, C, A, ψC and ψC are all crucial information to the players,
but for “genuinely positional” strategies, the initial state q0 and the initial time limit
γ0 should only be available to a player when the game is in the initial configuration
(q0, γ0). However, we can show that q0 and γ0 are indeed unnecessary bits of informa-
tion for the players when the game is not in the initial configuration. This follows from
Proposition 4.10 which we present later.
Different choices for time limit bounds Γ give rise to different semantic systems, and
most results in the next section will be proven for an arbitrary choice of Γ. However, in
this paper we mainly focus on the cases Γ = ω and Γ = 2κ, where κ is the cardinality of
the model. We will prove later that time limit bounds greater than 2κ are not needed,
and in finite models time limit bounds of the size κ suffice.
Definition 3.10. Let M be a CGM, q ∈ St and ϕ an ATL-formula. Let κ be the
cardinality of the model M. We define three different notions of truth of ϕ in M and
q, based on the three different evaluation games, thereby defining the unbounded,
bounded and finitely bounded semantics, denoted respectively by |=gu, |=gb , and
|=gf , as follows.
• M, q |=gu ϕ iff E has a winning strategy in G(M, q, ϕ).
• M, q |=gb ϕ iff E has a winning strategy in G(M, q, ϕ, 2κ).
• M, q |=gf ϕ iff E has a winning strategy in G(M, q, ϕ, ω).
We also write more generally that M, q |=gΓ ϕ iff E has a winning strategy in
G(M, q, ϕ,Γ). This is called Γ-bounded semantics.
Note that in the bounded GTS the time limit bound Γ is fixed based on the given
model. On the other hand, Γ-bounded GTS has a fixed value of Γ that is used for every
model (this kind of semantics may also be called uniformly bounded.)
We will prove that both the bounded and the unbounded semantics are equivalent to
the standard compositional semantics of Definition 2.3. The finitely bounded semantics,
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on the other hand, will turn out non-equivalent to these, but equivalent to a natural
variant of the compositional semantics, introduced in Section 5. We will also see that
each Γ-bounded GTS (for an arbitrary fixed value of Γ) is non-equivalent to the standard
compositional semantics. The following example shows that the finitely bounded GTS
differs from both the unbounded and bounded cases. In particular, the fixed point
characterisation of the temporal operator F , viz. 〈〈A〉〉F p ≡ p ∨ 〈〈A〉〉X 〈〈A〉〉F p, fails
with finitely bounded GTS, as seen by the example.
Example 3.11. Consider the CGMM=({a}, {q0} ∪ N× N, {p},N, d, o, v) in Figure 1,
where v(p) = {(i, i) | i ∈ N}, d(a, q0) = N, d(a, (i, j)) = {0}, o(q0, i) = (i, 0) and
o((i, j), 0) = (i, j+1).
In this modelM, q0 6|=gf 〈〈∅〉〉F p, because for every time limit n < ω chosen by Eloise,
Abelard may select the action n in the first round for the agent a, so it will take n+1
rounds to reach a state where p is true. On the other hand,M, q0 |=gf 〈〈∅〉〉X 〈〈∅〉〉F p and
therefore M, q0 |=gf p ∨ 〈〈∅〉〉X 〈〈∅〉〉F p, because, after the first step the game will be at a
state (i, 0) for some i ∈ N, whence Eloise can choose any time limit n ≥ i and reach a
state where p is true before time runs out.
However, M, q0 |=gb 〈〈∅〉〉F p, since Eloise can choose ω as the time limit in the
beginning of the game and then lower it to i < ω when the next state (i, 0) is reached.
Also, M, q0 |=gu 〈〈∅〉〉F p since a state where p is true will always be reached in a finite
number of steps.
Despite these observations, we will show that the three semantics become equivalent
over image-finite models.
M:
¬pq0
¬p
¬p
¬p
p · · ·
0
1
2
3
¬p
¬p
p · · ·
¬p0
0
0
0 ¬p
p · · ·
¬p0
0
0 p
¬p
· · ·
0
0 ¬p0
Figure 1: 〈〈A〉〉F p ≡ p ∨ 〈〈A〉〉X 〈〈A〉〉F p fails in the finitely bounded GTS.
4 Analysing embedded games
In this section we will examine the properties of different versions of embedded games
that occur as parts of evaluation games. We associate with each state a winning time
label which describes how good that state is for the players. The optimal labels will
be used to define a canonical strategy which will be a winning strategy whenever there
exists one. With these notions we shall prove positional determinacy of the embedded
games. We will also show that if the players are allowed to announce sufficiently large
ordinals as time limits, then bounded embedded games become essentially equivalent
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to corresponding unbounded embedded games. Furthermore, we shall analyse how the
sizes of the needed ordinals depend on the CGM in which the game is played.
4.1 Winning time labels
Different values of the time limit bound Γ correspond to different classes of bounded
embedded games G[γ0] where γ0 < Γ. In this section we use a fixed (unless otherwise
specified) value of Γ and will assume that all bounded embedded games are part of some
evaluation game G(M, qin, ϕ,Γ). Since Γ could have any ordinal value, our results will
hold, in particular, for both 2κ-bounded and finitely bounded semantics.
If G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) is an embedded game and q ∈ St, we write G[q] :=
g(V,C, A, q, ψC, ψC). We also use the abbreviation G[q, γ] := (G[q])[γ]. This notation
is useful because, by the recursive nature of bounded embedded games, any configuration
(γ, q) of G[γ0] (where γ0 < Γ) is the initial configuration of G[q, γ].
We next define winning strategies for embedded games. Here “winning an embedded
game” intuitively means having a winning strategy in the evaluation game that continues
from the exit position of the embedded game.
Definition 4.1. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game.
1. We say that σP is a winning strategy for the player P in G if the following
conditions hold:
a) infinite plays are possible with σP only if P 6= C.
b) the equivalence M, q |=gu ψ ⇔ P = V holds for all exit positions (V, q, ψ) of G
that can be reached when P plays using σP .
2. Let γ0 < Γ.
• Suppose that P = C. We say that the pair (σP, t) is a timed winning strategy
for P in G[γ0] if the equivalenceM, q |=gΓ ψ ⇔ P = V holds for all exit positions
(V, q, ψ) that can be encountered when P plays using the strategy σP and the
timer t.
• Suppose that P 6= C. We say that σP is a winning strategy for P in G[γ0] if
the equivalenceM, q |=gΓ ψ ⇔ P = V holds for all exit positions (V, q, ψ) that can
occur when P plays using σP.
If the unbounded (respectively, bounded) embedded game ends in a position where the
equivalence M, q |=gu ψ ⇔ P = V (respectively, M, q |=gΓ ψ ⇔ P = V) holds, we say
that P wins the embedded game. In the unbounded case, C also wins in the case where
the play is infinite. (Note that it now follows that, in every play of the embedded game,
exactly one of the players wins.)
We next define for an embedded game G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) so called winning
time labels, LP(q), for each q ∈ St. The labels will indicate how good the state q is for
the player P when different bounded embedded games G[q, γ0] are played with different
time limits γ0 < Γ. If the label is “win”or“lose”, then the state is a winning (respectively,
losing) state for P, regardless of the time limit γ0. If the label is an ordinal γ < Γ, it
means that γ is the “critical time limit” for winning or losing the game. More precisely,
if P = C, γ is the least time limit needed for P to win from q, and if P 6= C, then γ
is the least time limit such that P can no longer guarantee that (s)he will not lose the
game from q.
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From now on we will often consider separately the cases where the player P is the
controlling player C and where her/his opponent P is the controlling player. The former
case correspond to the situation where P is the verifier in an eventuality game or the
falsifier in a safety game. The latter case means that P is the verifier in a safety game
or is the falsifier in an eventuality game.
Definition 4.2. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game and P ∈ {A,E}.
The winning time label LP(q) for P in G at state q ∈ St is defined as follows.
Case 1. Suppose P = C. Let σP be a strategy for P. We first define a strategy label
l(q, σP) as follows.
• Set l(q, σP) := lose if (σP, t) is not a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ] for any timer
t and γ < Γ.
• Else, set l(q, σP) := γ, where γ < Γ is the least time limit for which there is a timer t
such that (σP, t) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ].
When there exists at least one strategy σP for P such that l(q, σP) 6= lose, we define
LP(q) as the least ordinal value of strategy labels l(q, σP). Else, we define LP(q) := lose.
Case 2. Suppose P 6= C. Let σP be a strategy for P. We define l(q, σP) as follows.
• Set l(q, σP) := win if σP is a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ] for every time limit
γ < Γ.
• Else, set l(q, σP) := γ, where γ < Γ is the least time limit such that σP is not a
winning strategy in G[q, γ].
If l(q, σP) = win for some σP, then set LP(q) := win. Else, set LP(q) to be the least
upper bound for the values l(q, σP).
The following lemma shows that if the controller has a timed winning strategy within
some time limit, then (s)he has a timed winning strategy which is winning for all greater
time limits as well. This claim may seem obvious, but needs to be proven nevertheless,
since there is no guarantee that a winning strategy for some smaller time limit would
make good choices also at configurations with larger time limits.
Lemma 4.3. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game. We assume that
P = C and that P has a timed winning strategy (σP, t) in G[γ0] for some γ0 < Γ. Then
there is a pair (σ′P, t
′) which is a timed winning strategy in G[γ] for any time limit γ
such that γ0 ≤ γ < Γ.
Proof. The idea here is that we define the timed strategy (σ′P, t
′) at a configuration
(γ, q) by using the choices given by (σP, t) for the smallest γ
′ ≤ γ such that (σP, t) is a
winning strategy for G[q, γ′]. See the appendix for a detailed proof.
The following proposition relates values of winning time labels to durations of em-
bedded games and existence of winning strategies.
Proposition 4.4. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game, P ∈ {A,E}
and q ∈ St.
1. If P = C, then:
i) LP(q) = γ < Γ iff there is a pair (σP, t) that is a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ′]
for all γ′ s.t. γ ≤ γ′ < Γ, but there is no timed winning strategy for P in G[q, γ′] for
any γ′ < γ.
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ii) LP(q) = lose iff there is no timed winning strategy (σP, t) for P in G[q, γ] for any
γ < Γ.
2. If P 6= C, then:
i) LP(q) = γ < Γ iff for every γ′ < γ, there is some σP which is a winning strategy
for P in G[q, γ′], but there is no winning strategy for P in G[q, γ′] for any γ′ s.t.
γ ≤ γ′ < Γ.
ii) LP(q) = win iff there is a strategy σP which is a winning strategy in G[q, γ] for
every γ < Γ.
Proof. The proof follows quite directly from the definition of winning time labels. We
also need to use Lemma 4.3 when proving the case (1), i). More details are given in the
appendix.
Winning time labels LP(q) of an embedded game are either ordinals less than the
time limit bound Γ, or else, labels win, lose. If we increased the value of Γ to some Γ′ > Γ
and considered the values of winning time labels of the corresponding embedded game
within the evaluation game G(M, qin, ϕ,Γ′), then some of the labels that originally were
win or lose, could now obtain ordinal values γ such that Γ ≤ γ < Γ′. Other kinds of
changes of labels would also be possible because the “truth sets” of the goal formulae
ψC and ψC could change; see the following example.
Example 4.5. Consider the CGMM=({a}, {qi | i ∈ N}, {p}, {0}, d, o, v), where d(qi) =
{0} for each i, o(qi, 0) = qi+1 for each i ∈ N and v(p) = {q3} (see Figure 2). Let
ψ := 〈〈∅〉〉F p.
We consider the embedded game related to ψ with the time limit bounds 3 and 4. When
Γ = 3, Eloise has the following winning time labels: the state q0 has the label lose, q1
the label 2, q2 the label 1, q3 the label 0 and all the other states have the label lose.
When Γ is increased to 4, then the label of q0 changes from lose to the value 3, but the
other labels remain the same.
Let then
ϕ := 〈〈∅〉〉Fψ (= 〈〈∅〉〉F 〈〈∅〉〉F p).
We then consider the embedded game related to ϕ with the time limit bounds 3 and 4.
When Γ = 3, Eloise’s winning time labels are as follows: the state q0 has the label 1, the
states q1, q2 and q3 have the label 0 and all the other states have the label lose. When
Γ is increased to 4, then the label of q0 is lowered from 1 to 0, but all the other labels
remain the same.
q0 q1 q2 q3 q4
¬p ¬p ¬p p ¬p . . .
0 0 0 0 0
Figure 2: An example of a game in which increasing the time limit bound lowers some
winning time labels.
However, if all ordinal valued labels stay strictly below Γ in all embedded games
when going from Γ to Γ′, then each label in fact remains the same in the transition.
This is shown by the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.6. Let Γ,Γ′ > 0 be ordinals such that Γ < Γ′. Consider bounded evalua-
tion games GΓ = G(M, qin, ϕ,Γ) and GΓ′ = G(M, qin, ϕ,Γ′). Suppose that all the ordinal
valued winning time labels, for the embedded games of GΓ′, are strictly smaller than Γ.
Then players have exactly the same winning time labels for the embedded games of GΓ′
as as they have for the embedded games of GΓ.
Proof. (Sketch) Since winning time labels determine the time limits needed for winning,
there is no need for the players to announce any higher ordinals than the winning time
labels. Therefore, by the assumption that all winning time labels of the embedded games
within GΓ′ are below Γ, we can show that Γ′-bounded GTS becomes equivalent with Γ-
bounded GTS. From this it follows that, for any embedded game, the same winning
time labels are constructed with respect to both Γ and Γ′. For more details, see the
proof in the appendix.
We say that an ordinal Γ is stable for an embedded game G if the winning time
labels of G cannot be altered by increasing the time limit bound from Γ to any higher
ordinal. We say that Γ is globally stable for a CGMM if Γ is stable for all bounded
embedded games within all evaluation games G(M, qin, ϕ,Γ). By Proposition 4.6, it is
equivalent to say that Γ is globally stable for M if, in the evaluation games for M, we
cannot create any labels with the ordinal value γ ≥ Γ by increasing the value of the time
limit bound Γ to any Γ′ > Γ.
We will see later that there exists a globally stable time limit bound for every con-
current game model. When Γ is globally stable, its role is not so relevant any more,
since players would not benefit from the ability to choose arbitrarily high time limits.
However, we always need some time limit bound in order to avoid strategies becoming
proper classes.
4.2 Canonical strategies for embedded games
Here we define so-called canonical strategies. They are guaranteed to be winning strate-
gies whenever a winning strategy exists. In the following definition we first consider the
case where the player P is the controller C.
Definition 4.7. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game, let P ∈ {A,E},
and assume that P = C. We define a canonical strategy τP for P in G, for each
q ∈ St, as follows.
• If LP(q) = γ, then τP(q) = σP(γ, q) for some strategy σP for which there is a timer t
such that (σP, t) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ
′] for all γ′ such that γ ≤ γ′ < Γ.
(Note that such a strategy exists by Proposition 4.4).
• If LP(q) = lose, then we put τP(q) = any.
We define the canonical timer tcan for P in G for any pair (γ, q) (where γ < Γ is
a limit ordinal and q ∈ St) as follows.
• if LP(q) 6= lose and LP(q) < γ, then tcan(γ, q) = LP(q).
• otherwise tcan(γ, q) = any.
We call the pair (τP, tcan) a canonically timed strategy (for the controller).
Note that τP is not necessarily unique since we may have to choose one from several
strategies. However, these choices are all equally good for our purposes. Note also
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that the canonical strategy τP depends only on states and can thus be used in both
unbounded and bounded embedded games.
We will see that if C has a timed winning strategy in G[γ0] for some γ0 < Γ, then
C wins G[γ0] with (τC, tcan). The canonical strategy of C can also be seen as optimal
for winning the game as fast as possible. This is because the canonical strategy always
follows actions given by a strategy that is a winning strategy with the lowest possible
time limit.
In the next definition we consider different types of canonical strategies for the case
where the player P is not the controller C.
Definition 4.8. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game, let P ∈ {A,E}
and assume that P 6= C. We define a canonical strategy τP for P in G[γ0] for all
γ0 < Γ, at every configuration (γ, q) where γ < Γ and q ∈ St, as follows.
• If LP(q) = win, then τP(γ, q) = σP(γ, q) for some σP that is a winning strategy in
G[q, γ] for every γ < Γ (such a strategy exists by Proposition 4.4).
• Else, if LP(q) = γ′ and γ′ > γ, then τP(γ, q) = σP(γ, q) for some σP that is a winning
strategy in G[q, γ] (such a strategy exists by Proposition 4.4).
• Otherwise we define τP(γ, q) = any.
We also define, for every n < ω, the n-canonical strategy τnP for P in G, for each
q ∈ St, as follows.
• If LP(q) ≥ ω or LP(q) = win, then τnP(q) = τP(n, q).
• Else, if LP(q) = m > 0, then τnP(q) = σP(m−1, q) for some σP that is a winning
strategy in G[q,m− 1]. (Such a strategy exists by Proposition 4.4).
• Otherwise τnP(q) = any.
Finally, when Γ is a successor ordinal, we define the ∞-canonical strategy τ∞P for
P in G, for each q ∈ St, as follows.
• If LP(q) = win, then τ∞P (q) = τP(Γ−1, q).
• otherwise τ∞P (q) = any.
When P 6= C, the canonical strategy τP depends on time limits, and thus it cannot
be used in unbounded embedded games. However, both n-canonical and ∞-canonical
strategies depend only on states. We fix the notation such that hereafter τP, τ
n
P and τ
∞
P
will always denote canonical strategies (of the respective type) for the player P.
As we will see, canonical strategies τC for C are optimal in a sense that if C has
a winning strategy in G[γ0] for some γ0 < Γ, then C wins G[γ0] with τC. We will see
later that n-canonical strategies are important in the finitely bounded evaluation games
and∞-canonical strategies in evaluation games with sufficiently large time limit bounds
Γ. Intuitively, the ∞-canonical strategy always assumes that the highest possible time
limit Γ− 1 has been set for every position. Thus, when C uses an∞-canonical strategy,
(s)he plays as carefully as possible, always assuming the ‘worst’ possible time limit Γ−1.
The n-canonical strategy behaves in a similar way, but under the assumption that the
initial time limit γ0 was set to at most n.
The following definition will be useful in our proofs later on.
Definition 4.9. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game. Let σP be a
strategy in G[γ0] (γ0 < Γ). Consider a configuration (γ, q) and suppose that σP(γ, q) is
either a tuple of actions for A or some response function for A. We say that set Q ⊆ St
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is forced by σP(γ, q) if for each q
′ ∈ St, it holds that q′ ∈ Q if and only if there is some
play with σP from (γ, q) such that the next configuration is (γ
′, q′) for some γ′. We use
the same terminology for the set forced by σP(q) when σP depends only on states.
The following proposition shows that the canonical strategy (with the canonical
timer) is guaranteed to be a (timed) winning strategy always when such a strategy
exists.
Proposition 4.10. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game, P ∈ {A,E}
and γ0 < Γ.
1. Suppose that P = C. If P has any timed winning strategy (σP, t) in G[γ0], then
(τP, tcan) is a timed winning strategy for P in G[γ0].
2. Suppose that P 6= C. If P has any winning strategy σP in G[γ0], then τP is a winning
strategy for P in G[γ0].
Proof. The proof follows quite routinely from Definitions 4.7 and 4.8. See details in the
Appendix.
Recall Remark 3.9 on “genuinely positional” strategies. Since canonically timed
strategies and canonical strategies depend on neither the initial state q0 nor the ini-
tial time limit γ0, it follows that if a player has a winning strategy in an embedded
game, then (s)he has a genuinely positional winning strategy. Also the converse clearly
holds: if (s)he has a genuinely positional winning strategy, she has a standard winning
strategy.
By the first claim of the previous proposition, we see that it suffices to consider
those strategies of player C which are independent of time limits in configurations. The
following lemma shows that the same holds for the player C in bounded embedded
games with a finite time limit. The key here will be the use of n-canonical strategies
which only depend on states.
Lemma 4.11. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game, let P ∈ {A,E}
and assume that P 6= C. For any n < ω, if P has a winning strategy σP in G[m] for
some m ≤ n, then τnP is a winning strategy in G[m].
Proof. We will prove by induction on m ≤ n that for any q ∈ St, if P has winning
strategy in G[q,m], then τnP is a winning strategy in G[q,m]. If m = 0 and P has a
winning strategy σP in G[q, 0], then every strategy of P will be a winning strategy in
G[q, 0]. Hence, in particular, τnP is a winning strategy in G[q, 0].
Suppose then that the claim holds for m−1 and that P has a winning strategy in
G[q,m]. Thus, by Proposition 4.4, we have LP(q) > m or LP(q) = win.
Suppose first that LP(q) = m′ < ω, and let σP be a strategy for which l(q, σP) = m′
and τnP(q) = σP(m
′−1, q) (such a strategy σP exists by the definition of τnP). Let Q ⊆ St
be the set of states forced by σP(m
′−1, q). Since m′ > m, the strategy σP must be a
winning strategy in G[q,m], and thus it will also be a winning strategy in G[q′,m−1] for
every q′ ∈ Q. Thus, by the inductive hypothesis, τnP is a winning strategy in G[q′,m−1]
for every q′ ∈ Q. Therefore we observe that τnP will also be a winning strategy in
G[q′,m].
Suppose then that LP(q) ≥ ω or LP(q) = win, and let σP be a strategy such that
l(q, σP) ∈ {win} ∪ {γ < Γ | γ > n} and τnP(q) = τP(n, q) = σP(n, q). (Recall Definition
4.8; the strategy σP exists by the definitions of τ
n
P and τP.) Let Q ⊆ St be the set of
states that is forced by σP(n, q). Since m ≤ n, the strategy σP is a winning strategy in
G[q,m], and thus it is also a winning strategy in G[q′,m−1] for every q′ ∈ Q. Hence,
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by the inductive hypothesis, τnP is a winning strategy in G[q
′,m−1] for every q′ ∈ Q.
Thus, we observe that τnP is a winning strategy in G[q,m].
Example 4.12. If LC(q) = ω, the player C can win the game with any time limit
n < ω, but there is no single strategy that would win for every n. But if C knows that
the initial time limit is (at most) m, then (s)he knows that the m-canonical strategy will
a winning strategy for her/him. Therefore, intuitively, C only needs to know the time
limit when selecting the strategy, but not when using it (since n-canonical strategies
depend on states only).
4.3 Determinacy of bounded embedded games
The correspondence in the following proposition between the winning time labels of
C and C will be the key for proving determinacy of bounded embedded games. The
main idea for proving the proposition is similar to the one in the standard proof of the
Gale-Stewart Theorem.
Proposition 4.13. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game. Then for
each state q ∈ St and each ordinal γ < Γ, it holds that LC(q)=γ iff LC(q)=γ
Proof. (Sketch) We can prove the claim by transfinite induction on γ. The case γ = 0 is
clear, since if C cannot win the game with time limit 0, then C will win it automatically.
We then suppose that the claim holds for every γ′ < γ and prove the equivalence for
γ. If LC(q) = γ, then C has a winning strategy in G[q, γ] and thus C cannot have
a winning strategy in that game. Hence by Proposition 4.4 we have LC ≤ γ. By the
inductive hypothesis, LC 6= γ′ for every γ′ < γ and thus LC(q) = γ.
Suppose then that LC(q) = γ. If there existed some σC, γ′ < Γ and Q ⊆ St forced by
σC(γ
′, q) such that LC(q′) ≥ γ for every q′ ∈ Q, then we could have used σC to construct
a winning strategy for C in G[q, γ]. This is not possible since we have LC(q) = γ. Thus
it can be shown that C can play so that for all possible successor states q′, we have
LC(q′) < γ, whence by the inductive hypothesis LC(q′) < γ. Hence we can construct a
timed winning strategy for C in G[q, γ], and thus infer that LC(q) = γ. For a detailed
proof, see the appendix.
Recall that apart from ordinal values that are less than the bound Γ, the only possible
winning time label for C is the label lose (see Definition 4.2). Similarly for C, the only
non-ordinal value for the labels is win. Hence by the previous proposition, we also have
LC(q) = lose iff LC(q) = win.
It is now easy to show that all bounded embedded games are (positionally) determined.
Corollary 4.14. The controller C has a timed winning strategy in a bounded embedded
game g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC)[γ0] iff C does not have a winning strategy in that game.
Proof. If LC(q0) = lose, then LC(q0) = win, whence by Proposition 4.4, the player C
has a winning strategy and C does not have a timed winning strategy. Else LC(q0) = γ
for some γ < Γ. Now, by Proposition 4.13, also LC(q0) = γ. If γ ≤ γ0, then by
Proposition 4.4 the player C has a timed winning strategy, while C does not have a
winning strategy. Analogously, if γ > γ0, then C has a winning strategy, while C does
not have a timed winning strategy.
Due to the positional determinacy of bounded embedded games, we can prove that
also bounded evaluation games are positionally determined.
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Proposition 4.15. Let M be a CGM, q ∈ St, ϕ an ATL-formula, Γ > 0 an ordinal and
P ∈ {A,E}. Then P has a winning strategy in G(M, q, ϕ,Γ) if and only if P does not
have a winning strategy in (G, q, ϕ,Γ).
Proof. (Sketch) Since embedded games are positionally determined, we can prove the
positional determinacy of the evaluation games by a simple induction on ϕ. For a
detailed proof, see the appendix.
Consequently the following equivalence holds: M, q |=gΓ ¬ϕ iff M, q 6|=gΓ ϕ.
4.4 Finding stable time limit bounds
Definition 4.16. Let M be a CGM and let q ∈ St. We define the branching degree
of q, BD(q), to be the cardinality of the set of states accessible from q with a single
transition:
BD(q) := card({o(q, ~α) | ~α ∈ action(Agt, q)}).
We define the regular branching bound of M to be the smallest cardinal RBB(M)
for which the following conditions hold:
1. RBB(M) > BD(q) for every q ∈ St.
2. RBB(M) is infinite.
3. RBB(M) is a regular cardinal.
We will see that the value of RBB(M) is always a globally stable time limit bound for
M. We will also see that the regular branching bound is, in a sense, the smallest possible
time limit bound that is guaranteed to be stable (see the claim of Proposition 4.23).
Remark 4.17. Let κ be the smallest infinite cardinal for which BD(q) < κ for every
q ∈ St. Since successor cardinals are always regular, we must have RBB(M) ≤ κ+ (κ+
here is the successor cardinal of κ). However, in a typical case with infinite models, we
have RBB(M) = κ. In particular
RBB(M) = ω iff M is image-finite (that is, BD(q) < ω for every q ∈ St).
Also, if card(Act) ≤ κ or card(St) ≤ κ for an infinite κ, then necessarily RBB(M) ≤ κ+.
The following lemma shows an important correspondence between the canonical
strategies and the winning time labels of the controller.
Lemma 4.18. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game, P ∈ {A,E} and
P = C. The following holds for every q ∈ St: if LP(q) = γ > 0 and Q ⊆ St is forced by
τP(q), then LP(q′) < γ for every q′ ∈ Q, and
• max{LP(q′) | q′ ∈ Q} = γ − 1, if γ is a successor ordinal,
• sup{LP(q′) | q′ ∈ Q} = γ, if γ is a limit ordinal.
Proof. (Sketch) When LP(q) = γ > 0, by Proposition 4.10, (τP, tcan) is a timed winning
strategy in G[q, γ]. Therefore every winning time label in the set Q forced by τP(q)
must be an ordinal less than γ. If γ is a successor ordinal, then there must be some
state with label γ−1 in Q, and if γ is a limit ordinal, then γ must be the supremum
of the labels in Q (else there would be a winning strategy for C in G[q, γ′] for some
γ′ < γ). For more details, see the proof in the appendix.
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The following lemma shows that if a certain ordinal-valued winning time label exist
for an embedded game, then all the smaller winning time labels must exist for that
game, as well.
Lemma 4.19. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game and γ < Γ an
ordinal. Assume that LP(q) = γ for some q ∈ St and P ∈ {A,E}. Then for every δ ≤ γ
there is a state qδ for which LC(qδ) = δ.
Proof. We prove the claim by transfinite induction on γ < Γ for every q ∈ St. Let the
inductive hypothesis be that the claim holds for every γ′ < γ and suppose that either
of the players has winning time label γ at some state q. By Proposition 4.13, we have
LC(q) = γ.
Assume that δ < γ. If γ is a successor ordinal, then by Lemma 4.18 there is a
state q′ ∈ St such that LC(q′) = γ−1. Since δ ≤ γ−1, by the inductive hypothesis
there is a state qδ for which LC(qδ) = δ. Suppose then that γ is a limit ordinal. By
Lemma 4.18 , there must be a state q′ ∈ St such that LC(q′) = γ′ for some ordinal γ′
such that δ < γ′ < γ. Hence by the inductive hypothesis there is a state qδ for which
LC(qδ) = δ.
In the following proposition, we show that in finite models, all winning time labels
are strictly smaller than the cardinality of the model.
Proposition 4.20. Let M be a CGM. If card(M) = n < ω, then n is a globally stable
time limit bound for M.
Proof. (Recall that, by Proposition 4.6, if all possible winning time labels are below an
ordinal Γ, for an arbitrary time limit bound Γ′, then Γ is globally stable forM.) If there
was some state with a winning time label γ ≥ n, then by Lemma 4.19, there would be
a state q ∈ St for which LC(q) = n. Further, by Lemma 4.19, we would now find states
with winning time labels n−1, n−2, . . . , 0. But since each state may only have a single
label, this would mean that card(M) ≥ n + 1 > n, a contradiction. (This claim is also
quite obvious by the observation that the controller can only win the embedded game
by reaching a state in the truth set of the formula ψC. Hence it would not be beneficial
for the controller to go in cycles.)
The following result shows how to find an upper bound for the values of possible
winning time labels by just looking at the regular branching bound of a model. Recall
that a cardinal κ is regular if κ is equal to its own cofinality, i.e., there is no set of less
than κ many ordinals, each less than κ, with supremum κ.
Proposition 4.21. Let M be a CGM. Then RBB(M) is globally stable for M.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there is Γ′ > RBB(M) and an em-
bedded game G within a bounded evaluation game G(M, qin, ϕ,Γ′) such that in G at
least one of the players has winning time labels that are greater or equal to RBB(M).
By Lemma 4.19, there is q ∈ St for which LC(q) = RBB(M). Let Q ⊆ St be the set
of states that is forced by τC(q). Now card(Q) ≤ BD(q) < RBB(M). By Lemma 4.18,
LC(q′) < RBB(M) for every state q′ ∈ Q, and furthermore, since RBB(M) is a limit
ordinal, RBB(M) must be the supremum of the winning time labels of the states in Q,
i.e. sup{LC(q′) | q′ ∈ Q} = RBB(M).
Now every winning time label in Q is smaller than RBB(M) and the cardinality
of Q is less than RBB(M). Because RBB(M) is a regular cardinal, it is equal to its
own cofinality. Hence we must have sup{LC(q′) | q′ ∈ Q} < RBB(M). This is a
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contradiction and thus RBB(M) must be globally stable for M (recall Proposition 4.6
on global stability).
From Proposition 4.21 we obtain the following corollary on the stability of the time
limit bounds used with the bounded and finitely bounded GTS.
Corollary 4.22. Let M be any CGM.
1. If card(M) = κ, then 2κ is a globally stable time limit bound for M.
2. If M is image-finite, then ω is a globally stable time limit bound for M.
Proof. (1) Let card(M)=κ. If κ < ω, then by Proposition 4.20, κ is globally stable for
M, whence also 2κ is globally stable for M. And if κ ≥ ω, then RBB(M) ≤ κ+ ≤ 2κ
(see Remark 4.17) and thus, by Proposition 4.21, 2κ is a globally stable time limit bound
for M.
(2) IfM is image-finite, RBB(M) = ω. By Proposition 4.21, ω is globally stable for
M.
Note that we could replace 2κ with κ+ in the case (1) above. This gives us a stronger
result in the models of set theory that do not satisfy the generalized continuum hypoth-
esis. Also note that since RBB(M) is determined only by the size of the branchings
in the model, the cardinality κ of M might be much greater than RBB(M) (which is
globally stable for M).
As seen by Proposition 4.18, only sufficiently large branchings can generate winning
time labels of higher cardinality. Thus, when estimating the value of a stable time limit
bound, it suffices check the sizes of the large branchings in the model. We know by
Proposition 4.21, that RBB(M) is guaranteed to be stable for a CGM M, but can we
give any better estimate of a stable bound by just looking at the branchings inM? The
answer is negative, in the sense of the following Proposition 4.23. Indeed, it implies that
only knowing the least infinite strict upper bound of the branchings BD(q) of all states
q of a CGM M, no lower time limit bound than RBB(M) is guaranteed to be globally
stable for M. Before the proposition, we give some auxiliary definitions.
Let M be a CGM and let κ be an infinite cardinal such that the branching degrees
in M are strictly bounded by κ, that is BD(q) < κ for every q ∈ St . Then we say that
M is less than κ-branching. For an ordinal γ, we say that a CGM N realizes γ if
there is some state of N that realizes the winning time label γ in some embedded game.
Proposition 4.23. Let κ be an infinite cardinal. Then there exists a less than κ-
branching model M that realizes every γ < RBB(M) and where all branchings strictly
less than κ occur.
Proof. We begin the proof by constructing by transfinite induction a model Mγ for
each γ such that Mγ realizes exactly all ordinals less or equal to γ, and furthermore,
the following conditions hold.
1. If γ is a finite ordinal, then the branching degree BD(q) of each state q in Mγ is 1.
2. If γ is an infinite ordinal, then card(γ) ≤ γ is an upper bound for the branchings
BD(q) of the states q in Mγ . Furthermore, the following conditions hold.
(a) If card(γ) is a regular cardinal, then Mγ has a node with branching card(γ).
(b) If card(γ) is a singular (i.e., non-regular) cardinal, then all states in Mγ have
branching strictly less than card(γ).
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All such modelsMγ will be of the formMγ = (Agt,St,Π,Act, d, o, v), where Agt = {a},
q0 ∈ St, Π = {p} and Act = {δ | δ < γ}. We will always establish that the winning
time label for Eloise at the state q0 in the embedded game G = (E,E, ∅, q0, p,>) (which
arises when verifying the formula ϕ = 〈〈∅〉〉F p at q0) is equal to γ.
If γ = 0, we define M0 = (Agt,St,Π,Act, d, o, v) where St = {q0}, d(q0, a) = {0},
o(q0, 0) = q0 and v(p) = {q0}. Now BD(q0) = 1 and LE(q0) = 0.
Suppose then that γ is a successor ordinal. Consider the modelMγ−1 with LE(q0) =
γ−1 obtained by the induction hypothesis. Let M′γ−1 = (Agt,St′,Π,Act, d′, o′, v′) be
an isomorphic copy of Mγ−1 in which the state q0 is replaced by a new state q′. Let
Mγ = (Agt, St,Π,Act, d, o, v), where we define St := St′ ∪{q0}, d := d′∪{((q0, a), {0})},
o := o′∪{((q0, 0), q′)} and v := v′. Since BD(q0) = 1, the branchings ofMγ are bounded
in the desired way by the induction hypothesis. It is easy to see that LE(q0) = γ , and
all ordinals less than γ are realized in Mγ by the induction hypothesis.
Suppose then that γ is a limit ordinal. We next construct, for later use, a set of
ordinals Ψ ⊆ {δ | δ < γ} such that sup(Ψ) = γ. If card(γ) is a regular cardinal, then we
set Ψ = {δ | δ < γ }. Otherwise, when card(γ) is a singular cardinal, we do the following.
Let µ be the cofinality of γ, whence there exists some set S of ordinals strictly less than
γ such that sup(S) = γ and card(S) = µ. Let Ψ := S. Note that the following conditions
hold.
1. If card(γ) is regular, then card(Ψ) = card(γ).
2. If card(γ) is singular, then card(Ψ) < card(γ). (This holds for the following reason.
The cofinality operator cf satisfies cf (cf (α)) = cf (α) for each ordinal α. Therefore, if
cf (γ) = card(γ), we obtain a contradiction as follows: card(γ) = cf (γ) = cf (cf (γ)) =
cf (card(γ)) < card(γ), where the last inequality is due to card(γ) being singular. Thus
cf (γ) < card(γ), whence card(Ψ) = cf (γ) < card(γ), as required.)
By the inductive hypothesis, for every ordinal δ ∈ Ψ, there is a suitable model Mδ
where LE(q0) = δ. We build an isomorphic copy M′δ = (Agt, Stδ,Π,Actδ, dδ, oδ, vδ) of
every model Mδ so that the sets Stδ are disjoint and such that the state q0 is replaced
with a new state qδ in every model M′δ. Now let Mγ = (Agt, St,Π,Act, d, o, v), where:
• St = ⋃δ∈Ψ Stδ ∪{q0},
• d = ⋃δ∈Ψ dδ ∪ {((q0, a), {δ | δ ∈ Ψ})},
• o = ⋃δ∈Ψ oδ ∪⋃δ∈Ψ{((q0, δ), qδ)},
• v := {(p, ⋃δ∈Ψ vδ(p))}, i.e., v is the function that maps p to the union of the sets
vδ(p).
Since sup(Ψ) = γ, it is easy to see that LE(q0) = γ. Clearly Mγ has the required
properties, whence the transfinite induction for constructing the models Mγ has now
been completed.
Before completing our proof, we define a further class of models Nµ, for each infinite
cardinal µ, such that Nµ has a node q′ with BD(q′) = µ. These models Nµ are defined
simply for the sake of simplifying our subsequent arguments. Intuitively, the models
Nµ will be used in order to directly force the existence of sufficiently large branchings.
Formally, we define Nµ = (Agt, Stµ,Π,Actµ, dµ, oµ, vµ) as follows. We let Agt = {a}
and Stµ := {q′} ∪ {qδ | δ < µ, δ is an ordinal}. We also define Π = {p} and let Actµ be
the set of ordinals smaller than µ. We define the set of actions available to agent a at q′
to be the set Actµ, while the set of actions available elsewhere is defined arbitrarily. The
outcome of a choosing the action δ at q′ will lead to qδ. At other states, the outcomes
of actions are defined arbitrarily. Finally, we define vµ(p) = ∅.
23
To complete our proof, we now argue as follows. Let κ be an infinite cardinal.
Assume first that κ is regular. Let M be the disjoint union of the models Mγ and Nγ
for all γ < κ constructed above. Now,M is less than κ-branching, and since κ is regular,
we have RBB(M) = κ. Clearly M realizes exactly all ordinals γ < RBB(M) = κ, as
required. (Recall that RBB(M) is a globally stable limit bound and thus no labels
greater or equal to RBB(M) can be realized in M.) Assume then that κ is singular.
Now let M be the disjoint union of the models Mγ for all γ < κ+ and the models
Nγ for all γ < κ. Again M is less than κ-branching. Since κ is not regular, we have
RBB(M) = κ+, and thusM realizes exactly all ordinals γ < RBB(M), as required.
Example 4.24. By the proof of Proposition 4.23, we can construct a model M whose
branchings are strictly below the singular cardinal ℵω, but nevertheless, all the winning
time labels γ < ℵ+ω = RBB(M) are realized in M. Thus, if we know only that the
branchings of an arbitrary model N are bounded by the strict least upper bound ℵω, but
know nothing else about the model, we cannot give any better estimate than RBB(N ) =
ℵ+ω for a stable time limit bound for N .
4.5 Unbounded vs bounded embedded games
As mentioned earlier, ∞-canonical strategies τ∞P (recall Definition 4.8) are important
in evaluation games with sufficiently large time limit bounds Γ. We will see that if the
time limit bound Γ is stable and there exists a winning strategy for each γ < Γ, then τ∞P
will be a winning strategy for each γ < Γ. The intuition behind ∞-canonical strategies
is that the player does not know the current time limit γ (since the strategy depends on
states only), but (s)he is playing “defensively” by always assuming γ to have the highest
possible value (namely Γ− 1).
The following lemma shows that when Γ satisfies certain conditions, then, if P uses
an ∞-canonical strategy τ∞P and begins from a state with the label win, P will always
stay in states with the label win.
Lemma 4.25. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game, P ∈ {A,E} and
P 6= C. Assume that the time limit bound Γ is a successor ordinal and Γ−1 is stable for
G. Now, for every q ∈ St, if LP(q) = win and Q ⊆ St is forced by τ∞P , then LP(q′) = win
for every q′ ∈ Q.
Proof. Suppose that LP(q) = win and Q ⊆ St is forced by τ∞P (q). Let σP be a strategy
for which l(q, σP) = win and τ
∞
P (q) = σP(Γ−1, q) (such a strategy exists by Defini-
tion 4.8). For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there is some q′ ∈ Q for which
LP(q′) 6= win and thus LP(q′) = γ for some γ < Γ. Since Γ−1 is stable for G, we must
also have γ < Γ−1. Now there is a play of G[q,Γ−1] in which P is using σP and the
configuration (γ, q′) follows (Γ−1, q). But since LP(q′) = γ, the strategy σP cannot be
a winning strategy in G[q′, γ]. Hence σP is not a winning strategy in G[q,Γ− 1], which
is a contradiction since l(q, σP) = win.
The following proposition shows that when the time limit bound Γ is stable, then
bounded embedded games become essentially equivalent to unbounded embedded games.
For the proof, we use concepts that we have defined before. The key here is to use a
canonically timed strategy when P = C and an ∞-canonical strategy when P 6= C.
Proposition 4.26. Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC, ) be an embedded game and let P ∈
{A,E}. Suppose Γ is stable for G. Then the following equivalences hold—under the
exceptional assumption that the winning condition of the exit positions of the unbounded
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embedded game G (recall Definition 4.1) is defined by using the semantics |=gΓ instead
of |=gu 4.
• If P = C, then there is a winning strategy σP in G iff there is γ0 < Γ and a timed
winning strategy (σ′P, t) in G[γ0].
• If P 6= C, then there is a winning strategy σP in G iff there is σ′P which is a winning
strategy in G[γ0] for every γ0 < Γ.
Proof. Suppose first that P = C. If (σ′P, t) is a timed winning strategy in G[γ0] for
some time limit γ0 < Γ, then by Proposition 4.10, (τP, tcan) is a timed winning strategy
in G[γ0]. Now the strategy τP will also be a winning strategy in G (note that infinite
plays are impossible with τP and that τP depends on states only).
For the other direction, suppose that there is a winning strategy σP for P in G. We
assume, for the sake of contradiction, that P does not have a timed winning strategy in
G[γ0] for any γ0 < Γ. Hence, by Proposition 4.4, we have LP(q0) = lose. As consequence
of Proposition 4.13, we must now have LP(q0) = win. Let Γ′ := Γ+1. We construct
an ∞-canonical strategy τ∞
P
for P by using the strategies that correspond to embedded
games with the time limit bound Γ′. Since Γ is stable, the winning time labels of the
states will not change when Γ is increased and, in particular, the state q will still have
the value win for P. Now, the assumptions of Lemma 4.25 hold, and thus we can use it
to deduce that all (finite) plays of G with τ∞
P
will end at a state that has the label win
for P. But in order to lose G, the player P should end up at a state with the label 0.
Hence τ∞
P
must be a winning strategy for P in G (note here that τ∞P depends on states
only and thus may be used in G). This is a contradiction since we assumed that P has
a winning strategy in G.
Suppose then that P 6= C. If there is a winning strategy σP for P in G, then we
can define σ′P(γ, q) = σP(q) for every γ < Γ, whence σ
′
P will be a winning strategy in
G[γ0] for every time limit γ0 < Γ.
For the other direction, suppose that there is a strategy σ′P which is a winning
strategy in G[γ0] for every time limit γ0 < Γ. Then, by Proposition 4.4, we have
LP(q0) = win. As above, we can now increase Γ to Γ + 1 in order to construct an
∞-canonical strategy τ∞P for P in G. With the same reasoning as above, τ∞P will be a
winning strategy for P in G.
By using Proposition 4.26, we can now prove the equivalence of unbounded and
Γ-bounded game-theoretic semantics for a stable time limit bound Γ.
Theorem 4.27. Let M be a CGM, q ∈ St and ϕ an ATL-formula. Suppose that Γ > 0
is a globally stable time limit bound for M. Then we have
M, q |=gu ϕ iff M, q |=gΓ ϕ.
Proof. We prove by induction on ϕ that Eloise has a winning strategy in G(M, q, ϕ) if
and only if she has a winning strategy in G(M, q, ϕ,Γ). Since the rules for unbounded
and bounded evaluation games differ only for positions that lead to embedded games,
we only need to consider the cases where ϕ = ψU θ or ϕ = ψ R θ.
Let G be the unbounded embedded game that arises from ϕ. Since Γ is globally
stable for the modelM, it is stable for G. By the inductive hypothesis, the equivalence of
4However, we will see (by Theorem 4.27) that when Γ is globally stable forM, then these two notions
of truth become equivalent, and thus this exceptional assumption here becomes irrelevant. (Also note
that the exceptional assumption can only be considered relevant in situations where another “nested”
embedded game can be played after playing G).
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the two semantics holds for the formulae ψ and θ. We may thus assume that the winning
condition of the exit positions of G has been defined by using Γ-bounded GTS instead of
the unbounded GTS (recall the corresponding assumption in Proposition 4.26). Since Γ-
bounded evaluation games are determined (Proposition 4.15), it now follows that having
a winning strategy in G—or in G[γ0] for some γ0 < Γ—guarantees having a winning
strategy in the corresponding evaluation game that is continued (recall Definition 4.1).
The inductive step for ϕ can thus be proven easily by using Proposition 4.26.
If Eloise is the controller in G, then by Proposition 4.26 she has a winning strategy
in G if and only if there is some time limit γ < Γ such that she has a (timed) winning
strategy in G[γ]. And if Eloise is not the controller in G, then by Proposition 4.26, she
has a winning strategy in G if and only if she has a winning strategy in G[γ] for every
γ < Γ (chosen by the Abelard). The claim for ϕ thus follows.
Since Γ-bounded evaluation games are positionally determined for any time limit
bound Γ > 0 (by Proposition 4.15), in particular they are determined for such Γ that
are globally stable for a given model M. Hence Theorem 4.27 implies that unbounded
evaluation games (and unbounded embedded games) are positionally determined too.
By these results, we see that even if we had defined memory-based strategies for bounded
or unbounded evaluation games, the resulting semantics would have remain equivalent
to the current one.
As a direct corollary of Theorem 4.27 we obtain the equivalence of unbounded and
bounded game-theoretic semantics.
Corollary 4.28. Let M be a CGM, q ∈ St and ϕ an ATL-formula. Then
M, q |=gu ϕ iff M, q |=gb ϕ.
Proof. Assume that card(M) = κ. By Corollary 4.22(1), the ordinal 2κ is globally stable
for M and thus the claim follows from Theorem 4.27.
The proof above relies on the (global) stability of the time limit bound Γ = 2card(M).
We know by Proposition 4.21 that the time limit bound Γ = RBB(M) would also suffice
for this proof. But by Proposition 4.23, for any time limit bound Γ < RBB(M), there are
cases when Γ-bounded semantics is not equivalent with the unbounded GTS. Therefore,
we cannot use any fixed value of Γ in order to obtain this equivalence.
Even though the finitely bounded semantics is not equivalent to the unbounded
semantics (see Example 3.11), the three semantics become equivalent on a natural class
of models.
Theorem 4.29. Let M be an image-finite CGM, q ∈ St and ϕ an ATL-formula. Then
M, q |=gf ϕ iff M, q |=gu ϕ iff M, q |=gb ϕ.
Proof. Since M is image-finite, by Corollary 4.22(2), the ordinal ω is a globally stable
time limit bound for M and thus the claim follows from Theorem 4.27 and Corollary
4.28.
Note that in image-finite models all ordinal-valued winning time labels are finite.
Thus the controller would gain nothing from being able to use infinite ordinals in em-
bedded games.
26
5 Game-theoretic vs compositional semantics
5.1 Equivalence between the unbounded GTS and the compositional
semantics
We show that the unbounded game-theoretic semantics for ATL is equivalent to the
standard compositional semantics of ATL.
Theorem 5.1. Let M be a CGM, qin ∈ St and ϕ an ATL-formula. Then
M, qin |= ϕ iff M, qin |=gu ϕ.
Proof. (Sketch) The equivalence can be proven by induction on ϕ. The cases ϕ = p and
ϕ = ψ∨θ are easy. For the case ϕ = ¬ψ we need to use the determinacy of the evaluation
games from Proposition 4.15. In the cases for strategic operators 〈〈A〉〉Xψ, 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ
and 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ, we construct a strategy σP for the embedded (or one step) game using
the collective strategy SA and vice versa. For a detailed proof, see the appendix.
By Theorem 4.28 we immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.2. Let M be a CGM, qin ∈ St and ϕ an ATL-formula. Then
M, qin |= ϕ iff M, qin |=gb ϕ.
However, as we have discussed in Section 4.5, Γ-bounded GTS is not equivalent with
the unbounded GTS for any fixed value of the time limit bound Γ. Therefore the different
values of Γ lead to different semantic systems that are all non-equivalent to the standard
compositional semantics.
5.2 Finitely bounded compositional semantics
As shown earlier (Example 3.11), the finitely bounded game-theoretic semantics is not
equivalent to the standard compositional semantics of ATL. However, it can still be
shown equivalent to a natural semantics, to be defined next, which we call finitely
bounded compositional semantics.
Definition 5.3. Let M = (Agt,St,Π,Act, d, o, v) be a CGM, q ∈ St and ϕ an ATL-
formula. The truth of ϕ in M at q according to finitely bounded compositional
semantics, denoted by M, q |=f ϕ, is defined recursively as follows:
• The truth conditions for p ∈ Π, ¬ψ, ψ ∨ θ and 〈〈A〉〉Xψ are as in the standard
compositional semantics of ATL (see Definition 2.3).
• M, q |=f 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ iff there exists n < ω and a collective strategy SA such that for
each Λ ∈ paths(q, SA), there is some i ≤ n such that M,Λ[i] |=f θ and M,Λ[j] |=f ψ
for every j < i.
• M, q |=f 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ iff for every n < ω, there exists a collective strategy SA,n such
that for each Λ ∈ paths(q, SA,n) and i ≤ n, either M,Λ[i] |=f θ or there is j < i such
that M,Λ[j] |=f ψ.
For F and G we obtain the following derived truth conditions:
• M, q |=b 〈〈A〉〉Fψ iff there exists n < ω and a collective strategy SA such that for each
Λ ∈ paths(q, SA) there is i ≤ n such that M,Λ[i] |=f ψ.
• M, q |=f 〈〈A〉〉Gψ iff for every n ≥ 0 there exists a collective strategy SA,n such that
for each Λ ∈ paths(q, SA,n) and i ≤ n we have M,Λ[i] |=f ψ.
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There exists an interesting conceptual link between for-loops and while-loops on one
hand and the finitely bounded and unbounded semantics of ATL on the other hand.
This link is perhaps easiest to understand via the game-theoretic approaches to ATL se-
mantics, but it ultimately makes no difference whether compositional or game-theoretic
semantics is considered. The principal difference between the two types of loops is that
for-loops require an input parameter, let us call it an iterator, which determines how
many times the loop is executed. The iterator can be an input from elsewhere in the
program or even a fixed constant (although in the latter case, it is not clear whether the
construct in question should be regarded as a genuine loop). Similarly, in the finitely
bounded semantics, the execution of strategic formulae requires a finite input integer
which limits the number of steps to be taken in the model and is clearly analogous to
the iterator. While-loops and the unbounded semantics are similarly analogous to each
other, both being essentially iterative processes but without an iterator bounding the
number of executions.
It turns out that the finitely bounded compositional semantics simplifies, in a sense,
the meaning of the temporal operators U and R , and in particular of F and G , by
reducing them to simple infinitary disjunctions and conjunctions of iteration patterns
using X (see below). The iteration patterns correspond to finite approximations of the
respective fixed point characterisations (cf. [14]). Recall that the difference between
finitely bounded and the standard compositional semantics is essentially described by
Example 3.11.
To characterize the finitely bounded semantics, we now define series of ’iteration
operators’. For the sake of better illustration, we will only treat the cases of G and U
here.
In what follows A denotes an arbitrary coalition of agents. First, we define the
following operators on ATL formulae:
• GA;θ(ϕ) := θ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉Xϕ
• UA;ψ,θ(ϕ) := θ ∨ (ψ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉Xϕ)
Now, we define the following recursively over n ∈ N:
• G0A(θ) := θ; Gn+1A (θ) := GA;θ(GnA(θ))
• U0A(ψ, θ) := θ; Un+1A (ψ, θ) := UA;ψ,θ(UnA(ψ, θ)).
Lemma 5.4. For every CGMM and q ∈M, the following hold:
1. M, q |=f 〈〈A〉〉G θ iff M, q |=f GnA(θ) for every n ∈ N.
Furthermore, if θ only contains occurrences of strategic operators of the type 〈〈B〉〉X ,
then M, q |=f 〈〈A〉〉G θ iff M, q |= GnA(θ) for every n ∈ N.
2. M, q |=f 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ iff M, q |=f UnA(ψ, θ) for some n ∈ N.
Furthermore, if ψ and θ only contain occurrences of strategic operators of the type
〈〈B〉〉X , then M, q |=f 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ iff M, q |= UnA(ψ, θ) for some n ∈ N.
The equivalences above suggest how to modify the axioms characterising these op-
erators provided in [14], viz. to replace the biconditionals
FPG : (ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉X 〈〈A〉〉Gϕ)↔ 〈〈A〉〉Gϕ and
FPU : 〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ ↔ (ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉X 〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ))
by the respective implications
PreFPG : (ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉X 〈〈A〉〉Gϕ)→ 〈〈A〉〉Gϕ and
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PostFPU : 〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ → (ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ 〈〈A〉〉X 〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ)).
Lemma 5.4 has also partly been discussed in the follow-up work [18], where we present
a sound and complete infinitary axiomatization for the finitely bounded compositional
semantics of ATL by adding respective infinitary axiom schemes and inference rules.
5.3 Equivalence between the finitely bounded compositional and game-
theoretic semantics
To prove equivalence between the finitely bounded compositional semantics and the
finitely bounded GTS, we need to show that it is sufficient to consider strategies in the
embedded games that depend on states only. This property will be needed because
collective strategies for coalitions (SA) in the compositional semantics of ATL formulae
are positional (according to Definition 2.3).
Lemma 5.5. If Eloise has a winning strategy ΣE in a finitely bounded evaluation game
G(M, qin, ϕ, ω), then she has a winning strategy Σ′E which uses, in every bounded em-
bedded game, a strategy σE that depends only on states.
Proof. In summary, the idea is that if E=C in some embedded game, Eloise may play
with the canonical strategy τE that depends only on states. If E 6= C and Abelard
chooses n < ω as the time limit, Eloise may play with the n-canonical strategy τnE that
only depends on states. A more detailed explanation follows.
Suppose that ΣE is a winning strategy for Eloise in a finitely bounded evaluation
game G(M, qin, ϕ, ω). Let G = g(V,C, A, q0, ψC, ψC) be an embedded game that is
related to some position Pos in the evaluation game G(M, qin, ϕ, ω). Suppose first that
E = C. Then ΣE(Pos) = (n, σE) for some n < ω (the timer t is not used in the finitely
bounded case, and thus it can be omitted here). Since ΣE is a winning strategy in
the evaluation game, σE must be winning strategy in the embedded game G[n]. By
Proposition 4.10, the canonical strategy τE is a winning strategy in G[n] (the canonical
timer is not needed here). Suppose now that E 6= C. Then ΣE(Pos) maps every n < ω to
some strategy σE,n. Since ΣE is a winning strategy in the evaluation game, σE,n must be
winning strategy in the corresponding bounded embedded game G[n]. By Lemma 4.11 ,
for every n < ω, the n-canonical strategy τnE is a winning strategy in G[n].
Thus, it is easy to see that we can construct a strategy Σ′E for Eloise in such a way
that it only uses canonical strategies when E = C and maps all n < ω to n-canonical
strategies when E 6= C. Since these strategies depend on states only, the claim now
follows for Σ′E.
Using the previous lemma, we can now prove the equivalence between the finitely
bounded compositional and game-theoretic semantics using a similar induction as the
one in the proof of Theorem 5.1. See the proof in the appendix.
Theorem 5.6. Let M be a CGM, qin ∈ St and ϕ an ATL-formula. Then
M, qin |=f ϕ iff M, qin |=gf ϕ.
As we have seen in Example 3.11, the fixed point characterisation of the temporal op-
erator F fails with finitely bounded semantics (both compositional and game-theoretic).
But since finitely bounded GTS is equivalent with the standard semantics in image-finite
models (and in particular, finite models), the formula ¬〈〈A〉〉F p∧ (p∨ 〈〈A〉〉X 〈〈A〉〉F p) is
satisfied only in infinite models. Therefore we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5.7. ATL with finitely bounded semantics lacks the finite model property.
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It is well-known that ATL with the standard semantics has the finite model property.
By this fact, and the equivalence of the finitely bounded and the standard semantics in
finite models, we obtain the following interesting consequence.
Corollary 5.8. All validities of ATL with finitely bounded semantics are also valid with
the standard semantics.
Concluding remarks
Game-theoretic approaches have proved to be a natural and fruitful idea in many areas
of logic. The principal aim of this paper has been to develop a conceptual and tech-
nical framework for systems of game-theoretic semantics for ATL. The game-theoretic
perspective appears in the setting of ATL on two semantic levels: on the object level, in
the standard semantics of the strategic operators, and on the meta-level, where game-
theoretic logical semantics is applied to formulae. We have unified these two perspectives
in the semantic evaluation games designed here for ATL and argued that the resulting
versions of game-theoretic semantics are conceptually and technically natural from log-
ical as well as game-theoretic perspectives. Our bounded GTS provides a new frame-
work where truth of ATL-formulae can be established in finite time—even on infinite
models—despite the fact that ATL-formulae involve temporal operators that refer to
infinite computations.
The ideas and results in the present work can be naturally extended to other richer
languages. In particular, the recent paper [17] introduces GTS for the extended logic
ATL+. Because of the more expressive language of ATL+, which generally requires
memory-based strategies, the GTS for that logic is considerably more complex, while
formally extending the GTS for ATL developed here. Another recent paper, [19], intro-
duces a bounded semantics for the modal µ-calculus, directly inspired by the approach
in the current paper based on ordinals. This leads to games alternative to the usual
parity games where the durations of plays are always guaranteed to be finite. However,
[19] discusses the case for standard modalities rather than the strategic operators used
in the current article.
The finitely bounded compositional semantics for ATL and other expressive branching
time logics, naturally emerging from the present work, is of particular interest for several
reasons and deserves a separate study of its own. As a first step in that direction, in a
recent work [16], we have studied in more detail the finitely bounded semantics for the
computational tree logic CTL (which can be seen as a single-agent variant of ATL). In
particular, we have presented there sound and complete tableaux systems for checking
the validities of CTL with finitely bounded semantics, one of which is infinitary, while
the other is finitary and provides an EXPTIME decision procedure for the satisfiability
problem for that logic. Thus we establish EXPTIME-completess of the logic, the same
complexity as that of standard CTL. In [18], we extend these results and also provide
an infinitary complete axiomatization for ATL with finitely bounded semantics.
We will now briefly address two important issues on how the present work links to
other research. The first issue is—as already pointed out in the introduction—that some
of our technical results could have alternatively been derived using some general results
for coalgebraic modal logic. This is because concurrent game models can be viewed
as coalgebras for a game functor defined in [10], and the fixed-point extension of the
coalitional coalgebraic modal logic for this functor links to ATL in a natural way. Game-
theoretic semantics has been developed for coalgebraic fixed-point logics in [29, 9, 13]
and could indeed be used to obtain some of our results concerning the unbounded game-
theoretic semantics. However, as general and powerful that approach is, it would not be
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very helpful for readers not familiar with coalgebras and coalgebraic modal logic, so the
more direct and self-contained approach adopted in the present paper has its benefits.
Moreover, our work on bounded and finitely bounded semantics is not directly related
to existing work in coalgebraic modal logic, though even there some natural shortcuts
based on background theory could have been used. For example, using Ko¨nig’s Lemma,
it is easy to prove that the finitely bounded and unbounded game-theoretic semantics
are equivalent on image-finite models.
The second issue concerns links to alternating Turing-machines and automata, and
some possible applications. In addition to defining variants of GTS for ATL, we have also
identified a number of related useful concepts such as, e.g., n-canonical and∞-canonical
strategies as well as winning time labels for embedded games. All these could be useful
also outside the context of ATL. In particular, we believe that the finitely bounded
game-theoretic semantics can be used to connect different kinds of extensions of ATL
to alternating Turing-machines (and alternating automata) as well as different kinds of
games. Recalling that the size of the model domain is a sufficient initial time limit for
semantic games in finite models, it is easy to see that evaluation games directly translate
in polynomial time to equivalent alternating reachability games, thereby providing a
direct proof of the PTIME upper bound of the model checking problem of ATL. A
similar approach works also in the context of various extensions of ATL, such as ATL+,
as demonstrated in [17], where some known and some new results on the complexity
of model checking ATL+ and some of its fragments have been obtained by using these
links.
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APPENDIX: SOME TECHNICAL PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 4.3
We define the strategy σ′P for any configuration (γ, q), where γ < Γ and q ∈ St, as
follows.
• If (σP, t) is not a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ′] for any γ′ ≤ γ, set σ′P(γ, q) = any.
• Else, set σ′P(γ, q) = σP(γ′, q), where γ′ ≤ γ is the smallest ordinal such that (σP, t) is
a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ′].
We define the timer t′ for any pair (γ, q), where γ < Γ is a limit ordinal and q ∈ St, in
the following way.
• If (σP, t) is not a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ′] for any γ′ < γ, set t′(γ, q) = any.
• Else t′(γ, q) = γ′, where γ′ is any ordinal such that γ′ < γ and (σP, t) is a timed
winning strategy in G[q, γ′].
We prove by transfinite induction on γ < Γ for every q ∈ St that if (σP, t) is a timed
winning strategy in G[q, δ] for some δ ≤ γ, then (σ′P, t′) is a timed winning strategy in
G[q, γ]. The claim then follows.
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Let the inductive hypothesis be that the claim holds for every γ′ < γ and suppose
that (σP, t) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, δ] for some δ ≤ γ. Let δ′ < Γ be the
smallest ordinal such that (σP, t) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, δ
′]. Now δ′ ≤ δ ≤ γ
and σ′P(γ, q) = σP(δ
′, q).
Suppose first that δ′ = 0, whence (σP, t) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, 0]. Now
σ′P(γ, q) = σP(0, q) = ψC and thus (σ
′
P, t
′) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ].
Suppose then that δ′ > 0, whence we must have σP(δ′, q) 6= ψC. Let q′ ∈ St be
any possible successor state of q when P follows σP(δ
′, q). Now (σP, t) must be a timed
winning strategy in G[q′, δ′′] for some ordinal δ′′ < δ′ (if δ′ is a limit ordinal, then
δ′′ = t(δ′, q′), and if δ′ is a successor ordinal, then δ′′ = δ′−1). Since δ′ ≤ γ, we have
δ′′ < γ.
For the inductive step, suppose first that γ is a successor ordinal. Since we have
δ′′ < γ, we infer by the inductive hypothesis that (σ′P, t
′) is a timed winning strategy
in G[q′, γ−1]. Hence we see that (σ′P, t′) must be a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ].
Suppose then that γ is a limit ordinal. Since (σP, t) is a timed winning strategy in
G[q′, δ′′], the value of t′(γ, q′) is defined such that t′(γ, q′) < γ and (σP, t) is a timed
winning strategy in G[q′, t′(γ, q′)]. Thus, by the inductive hypothesis, (σ′P, t
′) is a timed
winning strategy in G[q′, t′(γ, q′)]. Hence we see that (σ′P, t
′) must be a timed winning
strategy in G[q, γ].
Proof of Proposition 4.4
1. We first consider the case where P = C.
i) Suppose first that LP(q) = γ < Γ. By Definition 4.2 there is some strategy σP
whose strategy label l(q, σP) is γ. Thus there is some timer t such that the pair (σP, t)
is a timed winning strategy for P in G[q, γ]. By Lemma 4.3 there is a pair (σ′P, t
′) which
is a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ′] for any γ′ such that γ ≤ γ′ < Γ. If there existed
some timed winning strategy (σ′′P, t
′′) for P in G[q, γ′] for some γ′ < γ, then we would
have l(q, σ′′P) ≤ γ′ and thus LP(q) ≤ γ′ < γ, which is a contradiction.
For the other direction, suppose that there is a pair (σP, q) which is a timed winning
strategy in G[q, γ′] for any γ′ such that γ ≤ γ′ < Γ, but there is no timed winning
strategy for P in G[q, γ′] for any γ′ < γ. Now l(q, σP) = γ, and for any other strategy
σ′P, we have either l(q, σ
′
P) = lose or l(q, σ
′
P) ≥ γ. Hence the smallest ordinal value for
the strategy labels at q is the ordinal γ, and thus we have LP(q) = γ.
ii) If LP(q) = lose, then l(q, σP) = lose for every strategy σP of P. Hence none of the
strategy-timer pairs (σP, t) is a timed winning strategy for P in G[q, γ] for any γ < Γ.
Conversely, if there is no timed winning strategy (σP, t) in G[q, γ] for any γ < Γ, then
we have l(q, σP) = lose for every σP and thus LP(q) = lose.
2. We now consider the case where P 6= C.
i) If LP(q) = win, then l(q, σP) = win for some strategy σP, i.e., σP is a winning
strategy in G[q, γ] for any time limit γ < Γ. Conversely, if there is some σP which is
a winning strategy in G[q, γ] for every time limit γ < Γ, then l(q, σP) = win and thus
LP(q) = win.
ii) Suppose that LP(q0) = γ < Γ, i.e., γ is the supremum of the strategy labels
l(q, σP). Suppose first that there is some σP for which l(q0, σP) = γ. Now σP is a
winning strategy in G[q, γ′] for any γ′ < γ. Suppose then that there is no maximum
value for the labels l(q, σP), whence γ must be a limit ordinal. Let γ
′ < γ. Since γ is
the least upper bound for the strategy labels l(q, σP), there must be some strategy σ
′
P
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for which l(q, σ′P) ≥ γ′+1, as otherwise γ′+1 would be a lower upper bound for the
strategy labels. We now observe that σ′P is a winning strategy in G[q, γ
′].
If there existed a winning strategy σ′P for P in G[q, γ
′] for some γ′ ≥ γ, then we
would have l(q, σ′P) > γ, and thus LP(q) > γ. Hence there cannot be any winning
strategy for P in G[q, γ′] for any γ′ such that γ ≤ γ′ < Γ.
For the other direction, assume that for every γ′ < γ, there exists a winning strategy
for P in G[q, γ′], but there exists no winning strategy for P in G[q, γ′] for any γ′ such
that γ ≤ γ′ < Γ. If we had LP(q) = win, we would end up with a contradiction by the
(already proved) result concerning the label win. If we had γ < LP(q0) < Γ, then, by the
(already proved) other direction of the current claim, there would have existed a winning
strategy for P in G[q, γ], which is a contradiction. And if we had LP(q) < γ, then, once
again by the other direction of the current claim, there would not have been any winning
strategy for P in G[q,LP(q)], again a contradiction. Hence, the only possibility left is
that LP(q0) = γ.
Proof of Proposition 4.6
In order to simplify this proof, we will use the determinacy of Γ-bounded evaluation
games (Proposition 4.15). By observing our proofs, we can confirm that this does not
lead to any circular argumentation. This is not surprising as Proposition 4.15 is proven
for an arbitrary time limit bound Γ > 0 without any assumptions on its stability. The
claim of the current proposition (4.6) is only needed for showing that certain time limit
bounds are guaranteed to be stable (Propositions 4.20 and 4.21). Note that by assuming
the determinacy of bounded evaluation games, a player wins a bounded embedded game
if and only if (s)he has a winning strategy in the bounded evaluation game that is
continued (recall Definition 4.1).
Let G be an (unbounded) embedded game that can occur within G(M, qin, ϕ). Now
the corresponding bounded embedded games G[γ] (for different time limits γ) can occur
within GΓ and GΓ′ . We need to show that the winning time labels for player P in G
are the same for all q ∈ St with respect to both Γ and Γ′. We first show that any exit
position of G is a winning position for P in GΓ if and only if it is a winning position
for P in GΓ′ (note that from this equivalence it follows that G has the same winning
condition with respect to both Γ and Γ′).
Let Pos = (P′, q, ψ) be a possible exit position of G. Suppose first that Pos is a
winning position for P in GΓ′ . By Proposition 4.4, the values of the winning time labels
for the controller determine the lowest sufficiently large time limit for winning the cor-
responding embedded game—if there is one. We may thus assume that, within her/his
winning strategy from Pos in GΓ′ , the player P always selects time limits corresponding
to her/his winning time labels for the initial positions of the embedded games. Let ΣP
denote such a strategy of P for GΓ′ . Since, by the asumption, all the winning time labels
of P are below the time limit bound Γ, it is possible for P to follow ΣP from Pos also
within GΓ (note that the rules for GΓ and in GΓ′ differ only when a time limit for an
embedded game is chosen). It is now easy to see that ΣP a winning strategy from Pos
in GΓ.
Suppose then that Pos is not a winning position for P in GΓ′ . By the determinacy of
bounded embedded games, Pos must be a winning position for P in GΓ′ . Hence, we can
argue exactly as above, that Pos is a winning position for P in GΓ and thus it cannot
be a winning position for P in GΓ. We can thus conclude that Pos is a winning position
for P in GΓ if and only it is a winning position for P in GΓ′ .
By the equivalence that was proven above, it is easy to see by Definition 4.2, that the
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bounds Γ and Γ′ cannot create two different ordinal valued winning time labels for P in
G. The remaining possibility is that there is a state q ∈ St which has a label lose/win
with the time limit bound Γ and some ordinal value γ with the time limit bound Γ′.
But, again by Definition 4.2, we see that this is possible only if γ ≥ Γ, which would
contradict the assumption that he winning time labels of P in G with respect to Γ′ are
all strictly below Γ. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.10
1. We first consider the case where P = C.
We will prove by transfinite induction on γ < Γ that for every q ∈ St, if P has a
timed winning strategy in G[q, γ], then (τP, tcan) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ].
Let the inductive hypothesis be that the claim holds for every γ′ < γ and suppose that
P has a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ]. By Proposition 4.4, we have LP(q) = δ for
some δ ≤ γ. Let σ′P be a strategy for which τP(q) = σ′P(δ, q) and there is a timer t′ such
that (σ′P, t
′) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, δ′] for all δ′ such that δ ≤ δ′ < Γ (such
a strategy exists by the definition of the canonical strategy τP).
Suppose first that δ = 0, whence (σ′P, t
′) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, 0]. Now
we have τP(q) = σ
′
P(0, q) = ψC and thus (τP, tcan) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ].
Suppose then that δ > 0, whence σ′P(δ, q) must be either some tuple of actions for the
coalition A or some response function for the coalition A. Let Q ⊆ St be the set of states
that is forced by σ′P(δ, q) and let q
′ ∈ Q. Since (σ′P, t′) is a timed winning strategy in
G[q, δ], there is δ′ < δ such that (σ′P, t
′) is a timed winning strategy in G[q′, δ′] (if δ is
a limit ordinal, then δ′ = t′(δ, q′), and else δ′ = δ − 1). Since δ ≤ γ, we have δ′ < γ.
For the inductive step, suppose first that γ is a successor ordinal. Since we have
δ′ ≤ γ−1, there is a timed winning strategy (σ′′P, t′′) in G[q′, γ−1] by Lemma 4.3. Thus,
by the inductive hypothesis, (τP, tcan) is a timed winning strategy in G[q
′, γ−1]. Since
this holds for every q′ ∈ Q, we see that (τP, tcan) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ].
Suppose now that γ is a limit ordinal. Since (σ′P, t
′) is a timed winning strategy in
G[q′, δ′], by Proposition 4.4 we must have LP(q′) ≤ δ′ < γ. Thus, by the definition of
the canonical timer, tcan(γ, q
′) = LP(q′). By Proposition 4.4, there is a timed winning
strategy (σ′′P, t
′′) in G[q′,LP(q′)]. Thus by the inductive hypothesis (τP, tcan) is a timed
winning strategy in G[q′,LP(q′)]. Since this holds for every q′ ∈ Q, and tcan(γ, q′) =
LP(q′) for every q′ ∈ Q, we see that (τP, tcan) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ].
2. We then consider the case where P 6= C.
We will prove by transfinite induction on γ < Γ that for every q ∈ Q: if P has a
winning strategy in G[q, γ], then τP is a winning strategy in G[q, γ].
Suppose first that γ = 0 and that P has a winning strategy σP in G[q, 0]. Now, since
with the time limit 0 the game will end at q immediately, every strategy of P will be a
winning strategy in G[q, 0]. Hence, in particular, τP is a winning strategy in G[q, 0].
For the inductive step, suppose that the claim holds for every γ′ < γ and that P
has a winning strategy σP in G[q, γ]. By Proposition 4.4, we have either LP(q) = win
or LP(q) > γ.
Assume first that LP(q) = win. Let σP be a strategy for which l(q, σP) = win and
τP(γ, q) = σP(γ, q) (such a strategy exists by the definition of τP). Let Q ⊆ St be the
set of states forced by σP(γ, q) and let q
′ ∈ Q. Since l(q, σP) = win, the strategy σP
is a winning strategy in G[q, δ] for every δ < Γ, and therefore, as we have γ < Γ, the
strategy σP must also be a winning strategy in G[q
′, γ′] for every γ′ < γ. Thus there is a
winning strategy in G[q′, γ′] for every γ′ < γ and every q′ ∈ Q. Hence, by the inductive
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hypothesis, τP is a winning strategy in G[q
′, γ′] for every γ′ < γ and q′ ∈ Q. Therefore
we observe that τP is also a winning strategy in G[q, γ].
Assume now that LP(q) = δ > γ. Let σP be a strategy for which l(q, σP) > γ and
τP(γ, q) = σP(γ, q) (such a strategy exists by the definition of τP). Let Q ⊆ St be the
set of states that is forced by σP(γ, q) and let q
′ ∈ Q. Since σP is a winning strategy in
G[q, δ′] for every δ′ < l(q, σP) and since we have γ < l(q, σP), the strategy σP must also
be a winning strategy in G[q′, γ′] for every γ′ < γ. Hence we can deduce, as before, that
τP is a winning strategy in the games for the configurations over Q that follow (γ, q),
and thus τP is also a winning strategy in G[q, γ].
Proof of Proposition 4.13
We prove this claim by transfinite induction on the ordinal γ < Γ. We first prove the
special case where γ = 0. Let q ∈ St and suppose first that LC(q) = 0, whence by
Proposition 4.4 the player C has a timed winning strategy (σC, t) in G[q, 0]. This is
possible only if the exit position (C, q, ψC) is a winning position for C. In that case C
loses G[q, γ′] with any time limit γ′ and thus LC(q) = 0. Suppose then that LC(q) = 0,
whence there no winning strategy for C in G[q, 0]. This is possible only if C wins at
the exit position (C, q, ψC), whence LC(q) = 0.
Now, let γ > 0. The inductive hypothesis is that the claim holds for every ordinal
γ′ < γ. Suppose first that LC(q) = γ. By Proposition 4.10 there is a timed winning
strategy (σP, t) in G[q, γ]. Hence C cannot have a winning strategy in G[q, γ], and
thus by Proposition 4.4 we must have LC(q) ≤ γ. If LC(q) < γ, then, by the inductive
hypothesis, we have LC(q) = LC(q) < γ, which is a contradiction. Therefore it must be
that LC(q) = γ.
Suppose then that LC(q) = γ. We will next show that for any strategy σC and any
set Q ⊆ St forced by σC(γ, q), there is a state q′ ∈ Q for which LC(q′) < γ. For the
sake of contradiction, suppose that there is a strategy σC such that for the set Q ⊆ St
forced by σC(γ, q), we have LC(q′) ≥ γ or LC(q′) = win for every q′ ∈ Q. We construct
the following strategy σ′
C
for C in the embedded game G[q, γ]:
σ′
C
(δ, q) = σC(γ, q) for every δ ≤ γ,
σ′
C
(δ, q′) = τC(δ, q
′) for every δ ≤ γ and q′ ∈ St \{q}.
Since LC(q′) ≥ γ or LC(q′) = win for every q′ ∈ Q, by Proposition 4.4, the canonical
strategy τC is a winning strategy in G[q
′, δ] for any q′ ∈ Q and δ < γ. Thus it is easy to
see that σ′
C
is a winning strategy in G[q, γ]. Hence, again by Proposition 4.4, we must
have LC(q) > γ or LC(q) = win, which is a contradiction. Therefore, we infer that
For any strategy σC and Q ⊆ St forced by σC(γ, q), (?)
there is some q′ ∈ Q such that LC(q′) < γ.
Let Q′ := {q′ ∈ St | LC(q′) < γ}. By the inductive hypothesis, LC(q′) < γ for every
q′ ∈ Q′. We will show that C can play in such a way at q that all possible successor
states will be in the set Q′. Suppose first that C = V. Since for every ~α ∈ action(q, A),
there is some strategy σC such that σC(γ, q) = ~α, we infer by (?) that there is some
response function for A which forces the next state to be in Q′. Suppose then that
C = V. If for every ~α ∈ action(q, A) there existed some ~β ∈ action(q,A) such that the
outcome state of these actions was not in Q′, then there would be some strategy σC
such that the set forced by σC(γ, q) would not intersect Q
′. This is a contradiction with
(?), and thus there is some tuple of actions for A at q such that all possible successor
states will be in Q′.
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We next construct a strategy σC for C in G[q, γ]. By the description above, we
can define σC for every configuration (γ
′, q), where γ′ ≤ γ, in such a way that the set
forced by σC(γ
′, q) is a subset of Q′. For all configurations (γ′, q′), where γ′ ≤ γ and
q′ ∈ St \{q}, we define σC(γ′, q′) = τC(q′). Since LC(q′) < γ for every q′ ∈ Q′, we infer
that tcan(γ, q
′) = LC(q′) < γ for every q′ ∈ Q. By Propositions 4.4 and 4.10 , (τC, tcan)
is a timed winning strategy in G[q′, tcan(γ, q′)] for any q′ ∈ Q′. Thus, it is easy to see
that (σC, tcan) is a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ]. However, since LC(q) = γ, we
conclude, using the inductive hypothesis, that there cannot be a timed winning strategy
for C in G[q, γ′] for any γ′ < γ. Hence by Proposition 4.4 we must have LC(q) = γ.
Proof of Proposition 4.15
Since both of the players cannot have a winning strategy, the implication from left to
right is immediate. We prove the implication from right to left by induction on ϕ.
• Suppose that ϕ = p (where p ∈ Π). By the rules of the game, it is easy to see that
each ending position is a winning position for either of the players. The claim follows
from this.
• Suppose that ϕ = ¬ψ. Since negation just swaps the verifier and falsifier for the
position, this case follows directly from the inductive hypothesis.
• Suppose that ϕ = ψ ∨ θ. Suppose that P does not have a winning strategy in
G(M, q, ψ∨θ). Suppose first that P = A, whence it is not possible that both (E, q, ψ)
and (E, q, θ) are winning positions for P. Thus, by the inductive hypothesis, at least
one of these positions must be a winning position for E = P, and thus P has a winning
strategy in G(M, q, ψ ∨ θ). Suppose then that P = E, whence neither of the posi-
tions (E, q, ψ) nor (E, q, θ) can be a winning position for P. Thus, by the inductive
hypothesis, both of these positions must be winning positions for A = P, and thus P
has a winning strategy in G(M, q, ψ ∨ θ).
• Suppose that ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉Xψ. This case can be proven by an analogous argument as
the one used in the inductive step of Proposition 4.13. Note that the rule related
to the position (E, q, 〈〈A〉〉Xψ) is just a special case of the bounded embedded game
g(E,E, A, q, ψ,⊥)[1] with the restriction that neither of the players may end the game
before the time runs out.
• Suppose that ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ. Let G be the embedded game that arises from ϕ.
From the inductive hypothesis it follows that the player who has a winning strategy
in G also has a winning strategy in the evaluation game that is continued (recall
Definition 4.1).
Suppose first that P = A, whence there must be (at least one) γ < Γ s.t. P does not
have winning strategy in G with the time limit γ. Since bounded embedded games are
determined (by Corollary 4.14), it follows from the inductive hypothesis, that E = P
must have a (timed) winning strategy in G[γ]. Hence P has a winning strategy in
G(M, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ) (P first chooses the time limit to be γ and then follows her timed
winning strategy in G[γ]).
Suppose then that P = E, whence P cannot have a (timed) winning strategy in
G with any time limit γ < Γ. Since bounded embedded games are determined (by
Corollary 4.14), it follows from the inductive hypothesis, that A = P must have
a winning strategy in G[γ], for every γ < Γ. Hence P has a winning strategy in
G(M, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ) (after P has chosen a time limit γ, then P just follows his winning
strategy in G[γ]).
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• The case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ is proven dually to the case ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ.
Proof of Lemma 4.18
Suppose that LP(q) = γ > 0. Since LP(q) 6= 0, canonically timed strategy (τP, tcan)
is not a timed winning strategy for P in G[q, 0]. Therefore τP(q) is either some tuple
of actions for A or some response function for A. Let Q ⊆ St be the set of states that
is forced by τP(q). We first show that LP(q′) < γ for every q′ ∈ Q. Since (τP, tcan)
is a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ], it must also be a timed winning strategy in
G[q′, tcan(γ, q′)] for every q′ ∈ Q. Hence by the definition of canonical timer γ >
tcan(γ, q
′) = LP(q′) for every q′ ∈ Q.
Suppose first that γ is a successor ordinal. If we would have LP(q′) < γ−1 for
every q′ ∈ Q, then (τP, tcan) would be a winning strategy in G[q, γ−1], and thus we
would have LP(q) ≤ γ− 1. Hence γ > LP(q′) ≥ γ− 1 for some q′ ∈ Q and thus
max{LP(q′) | q′ ∈ Q} = γ−1.
Suppose then that γ is a limit ordinal. If γ′ < γ would be an upper bound for the
winning time labels in Q, then we would have LP(q′) < γ′+1 for every q′ ∈ Q. Hence
(τP, tcan) would be a timed winning strategy in G[q, γ
′+1], and thus we would have
LP(q) ≤ γ′+1 < γ. This is impossible and thus sup{LP(q′) | q′ ∈ Q} = γ.
Proof of Theorem 5.1
We show by induction on ϕ that the following equivalence holds for every q ∈ St.
M, q |= ϕ iff M, q |=gu ϕ.
• Suppose that ϕ = p (p ∈ Π). This case is trivial since the winning condition for the
ending position (E, q, p) corresponds to the truth condition for p in the compositional
semantics.
• Suppose that ϕ = ¬ψ.
Suppose first thatM, q |= ¬ψ, i.e. M, q 6|= ψ. Therefore, by the inductive hypothesis,
M, q 6|=gu ψ. Since, by Proposition 4.15, evaluation games are determined, (E, q, ψ)
is a winning position for Abelard. Therefore, by the rule for negation, (A, q,¬ψ) is
also a winning position for Abelard. Since the all rules of the game for the players are
symmetric, dually (E, q,¬ψ) is a winning position for Eloise and thus M, q |=gu ¬ψ.
Suppose then that M, q |=gu ¬ψ. Now, by the rule for negation, (A, q, ψ) is a win-
ning position for Eloise and thus dually (E, q, ψ) is a winning position for Abelard.
But since only one of the the players can have a winning strategy from the position
(E, q, ψ), we must have M, q 6|=gu ψ. Hence, by the inductive hypothesis, M, q 6|= ψ,
i.e. M, q |= ¬ψ.
• Suppose that ϕ = ψ ∨ θ.
Suppose first that M, q |= ψ ∨ θ, i.e. M, q |= ψ or M, q |= θ. If the former holds, we
define ΣE(E, q, ψ ∨ θ) = ψ and else define ΣE(E, q, ψ ∨ θ) = θ. Now, by the inductive
hypothesis, the next position of the game must a winning position for Eloise and thus
M, q |=gu ψ ∨ θ.
Suppose then that M, q |=gu ψ ∨ θ, i.e. Eloise has a winning strategy ΣE from the
position (E, q, ψ ∨ θ). Now ΣE picks either ψ or θ. If ΣE(E, q, ψ ∨ θ) = ψ, then by
the inductive hypothesis we must have M, q |= ψ. And if ΣE(E, q, ψ ∨ θ) = θ, then
we analogously have M, q |= θ. Therefore M, q |= ψ ∨ θ.
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• Suppose that ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉Xψ.
Suppose first that M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉Xψ, i.e., there exists a collective strategy SA such
that for each Λ ∈ paths(q, SA), we have M,Λ[1] |= ψ. Let ΣE(E, q, 〈〈A〉〉Xψ) be the
tuple in action(A, q) which is determined by SA at q. Now, regardless of the actions
chosen by Abelard for the agents in A, the resulting state q′ must be Λ[1] for some
Λ ∈ paths(q, SA) and thus M, q′ |= ψ. By the inductive hypothesis M, q′ |=gu ψ,
i.e. Eloise has a winning strategy from the position (E, q′, ψ). Therefore we have
M, q |=gu 〈〈A〉〉Xψ.
Suppose then that M, q |=gu 〈〈A〉〉Xψ, i.e. Eloise has a winning strategy ΣE from the
position (E, q, 〈〈A〉〉Xψ). Now ΣE assigns some tuple of choices for the agents in A.
We can now construct a related collective strategy SA by using those choices at q;
the choices at other states may be arbitrary. Let Λ ∈ paths(q, SA). Now Abelard
can choose such actions for A that the resulting state is Λ[1]. Since ΣE is a winning
strategy, the position (E,Λ[1], ψ) is a winning position for Eloise. HenceM,Λ[1] |=gu ψ
and thus, by the inductive hypothesis, M,Λ[1] |= ψ. Therefore M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉Xψ.
• Suppose that ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ.
Suppose first that M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ, i.e., there exists SA such that for each Λ ∈
paths(q, SA), there is some i ≥ 0 such that M,Λ[i] |= θ and M,Λ[j] |= ψ for every
j < i. Let ΣE(E, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ) be the strategy σE, defined as follows: let σE(q′) = θ
for each q′ ∈ St where M, q′ |= θ, and for all other states q′ ∈ St, let σE(q′) be the
tuple of actions for the agents in A determined by SA. Now, regardless of the actions
of Abelard, all of the states that are reached in the embedded game must be states
Λ[i] for some Λ ∈ paths(q, SA) and i ≥ 0. Thus, when Eloise uses σE, a state q′ where
M, q′ |= θ is reached in a finite number of rounds. If Abelard ends the game before
that at some state q′, then we have M, q′ |= ψ. By the inductive hypothesis, either
of these cases will result in an exit position which is a winning position for Eloise.
Therefore we have M, q |=gu 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ.
Suppose then that M, q |=gu 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ, i.e. Eloise has a winning strategy ΣE from
the position (E, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ). Now ΣE(E, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ) is some strategy σE for the
corresponding embedded game. We can now construct a collective strategy SA that
is related to the strategy σE: for any state where σE assigns some tuple of actions
for agents in A, we define the same actions for SA. For states where σE instructs to
end the game, we may define arbitrary actions for SA. We will use this same method
from now on, when we define collective strategies SA related to the strategies of V in
an embedded game.
Let Λ ∈ paths(q, SA). Now, when Eloise uses σE there will be actions of Abelard such
that the states of the embedded game are on Λ until some configuration Λ[i] at which
Eloise ends the game at the exit position (E,Λ[i], θ). (Note that since ΣE is a winning
strategy, Eloise must always end the embedded game after finitely many steps.) Since
ΣE is a winning strategy, we must haveM,Λ[i] |= θ by the inductive hypothesis. Let
then j < i. Now Abelard can end the game after j rounds at the position (E,Λ[j], ψ).
Since that is a winning position for Eloise, we must haveM,Λ[j] |= ψ by the inductive
hypothesis. Therefore we conclude that M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ.
• Suppose that ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ.
Suppose that M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ, i.e. there exists a strategy SA such that for each
Λ ∈ paths(q, SA) and i ≥ 0 eitherM,Λ[i] |= θ or there is j < i such thatM,Λ[j] |= ψ.
Let ΣE(E, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ) be the strategy σE that is defined as follows: σE(q′) = ψ for
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each q′ ∈ St whereM, q′ |= ψ and for all other states q′ ∈ St, let σE(q′) be the tuple of
actions for the agents in A determined by SA. Now, all states that are reached in the
embedded game must be states Λ[i] for some Λ ∈ paths(q, SA) and i ≥ 0. Thus, when
Eloise uses σE, she will either stay at states q
′ where M, q′ |= θ for infinitely long or
reach a state q′ where M, q′ |= ψ at some point. Hence either 1) the embedded game
continues infinitely long, whence Eloise wins the whole evaluation game, or 2) by the
inductive hypothesis, the exit position is a winning position for Eloise. Therefore we
have M, q |=gu 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ.
Suppose then thatM, q |=gu 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ, i.e. Eloise has a winning strategy ΣE from the
position (E, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ). Now ΣE(E, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ) is a strategy σE. Let SA be the
collective strategy that is related to σE and let Λ ∈ paths(q, SA). Now, when Eloise
uses σE, there exist actions of Abelard such that the states of the embedded game
are on Λ (until a state is reached where Eloise ends the game—if such a state exists).
We need to show that for every i ≥ 0 either M,Λ[i] |= θ or there is j < i such that
M,Λ[j] |= ψ. Let i ≥ 0. If Eloise ends the game before i rounds, the game ends at
an exit position (E,Λ[j], ψ) for some j < i, and we can conclude thatM,Λ[j] |= ψ by
the inductive hypothesis. If Eloise does not end the game before i rounds have been
played, then Abelard can end it in the exit position (E,Λ[i], θ). We can then conclude
that M,Λ[i] |= θ by the inductive hypothesis. Therefore M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.6
By Lemma 5.5, we may assume for this proof that all of the (winning) strategies that
Eloise uses in embedded games depend on states only. This amounts to assuming that
their domain is the set of states instead of configurations. We also recall that timers are
not needed in the finitely bounded case. We show by induction on ϕ that the following
holds for every q ∈ St.
M, q |=f ϕ iff M, q |=gf ϕ.
• The cases where Pos = (P, q, p) (p ∈ Π), Pos = (P, q,¬ψ), Pos = (P, q, ψ ∨ θ) or
Pos = (P, q, 〈〈A〉〉Xψ) are treated exactly as in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
• Suppose that ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ.
Suppose first that M, q |=f 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ, i.e. there exist some n < ω and SA such
that for each Λ ∈ paths(q, SA), there is some i ≤ n such that M,Λ[i] |=f θ and
M,Λ[j] |=f ψ for every j < i. Let ΣE(E, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ) = (n, σE), where σE(q′) = θ
for each q′ ∈ St where M, q′ |=f θ and for all other states q′ ∈ St let σE(q′) be the
tuple of actions for the agents in A chosen according to SA. Now, when Eloise chooses
the time limit to be n and uses σE, then, regardless of the actions of Abelard, all
states that are reached in the game must be states Λ[i] for some Λ ∈ paths(q, SA) and
i ≤ n. Thus Eloise can reach a state q′ whereM, q′ |=f θ in n rounds; if Abelard ends
the game before that at some state q′, thenM, q |=f ψ. By the inductive hypothesis,
either of these cases will result in an exit position which is a winning position for
Eloise. Therefore we have M, q |=gf 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ.
Suppose then that M, q |=gf 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ, i.e. Eloise has a winning strategy ΣE from
the position (E, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ). Now ΣE(E, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ) = (n, σE) where n < ω. Let
SA be the collective strategy that is related to the strategy σE (see the corresponding
part in the proof of Theorem 5.1). Let Λ ∈ paths(q, SA). Now, when Eloise uses σE
there exist actions of Abelard such that the states of the embedded game will be on Λ
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until some configuration (n−i,Λ[i]) (with i ≤ n) at which Eloise ends the game at the
position (E,Λ[i], θ). (If she does not end the game, then it will automatically end at
the exit position (E,Λ[n], θ).) Since ΣE is a winning strategy, we have M,Λ[i] |=f θ
by the inductive hypothesis. Let then j < i. Since Abelard can end the game after j
rounds at the position (E,Λ[j], ψ), by the inductive hypothesis, we haveM,Λ[j] |=f ψ.
Hence M, q |=f 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ.
• Suppose that ϕ = 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ.
Suppose first thatM, q |=f 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ, i.e., for all n < ω, there exists a collective strat-
egy SA,n such that for each Λ ∈ paths(q, SA,n) and i ≤ n, we have eitherM,Λ[i] |=f θ
or there is some j < i such thatM,Λ[j] |=f ψ. Let ΣE(E, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψU θ) be a function
that maps every n < ω to σE,n, where σE,n is defined as follows. Let σE,n(q
′) = ψ for
each q′ ∈ St where M, q′ |=f ψ. For all other states q′ ∈ St, let σE,n(q′) be the tuple
of actions for the agents in A chosen according to SA,n. Now, when Eloise uses σE,n,
all states that can be reached must be states Λ[i] for some Λ ∈ paths(q, SA) and i ≤ n.
Thus Eloise will either stay at states q′ whereM, q′ |=f θ for n rounds or reach a state
q′ where M, q′ |=f ψ while maintaining the truth of θ. By the inductive hypothesis,
either of these cases will result in an exit position which is a winning position for
Eloise. Therefore we have M, q |=gf 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ.
Suppose then that M, q |=gf 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ, i.e. Eloise has a winning strategy ΣE from
the position (E, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ). Now ΣE(E, q, 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ) assigns some strategy σE,n
for every n < ω. Let n < ω and let SA,n be the collective strategy that is related
to σE,n. Let Λ ∈ paths(q, SA,n). Now, when Eloise plays using σE,n, there are some
actions of Abelard such that the states of the embedded game are on Λ until Eloise
ends the game or n rounds have lapsed. We need to show that for every i ≤ n either
M,Λ[i] |=f θ or there is some j < i such thatM,Λ[j] |=f ψ. Let i ≤ n. If Eloise ends
the game before i rounds have gone, the game ends at the position (E,Λ[j], ψ) for some
j < i. Then, by the inductive hypothesis, M,Λ[j] |=f ψ. If Eloise does not end the
game before i rounds have lapsed, then Abelard may end it at the position (E,Λ[i], θ),
whence, by the inductive hypothesis, M,Λ[i] |=f θ. Therefore M, q |=f 〈〈A〉〉ψ R θ.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
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